By Peter Symonds |WSWS, 21 February 2009
The top US commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, warned on Wednesday that the huge boost to US troop numbers announced this week would have to continue for years. His comments underscore the fact that the Obama administration is preparing for a dramatic escalation of the war in Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan that will inevitably heighten tensions throughout the region, especially in Central Asia.
In a bid to shore up the US-led occupation of Afghanistan, President Obama announced on Tuesday that an additional 17,000 US soldiers would be sent there. McKiernan told the media that the troop buildup was “not a temporary force uplift” and would “need to be sustained for some period of time,” adding that he was looking at “the next three to four to five years”. The US already has 36,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan, along with about 30,000 other foreign soldiers operating under NATO command.
The latest troop increase will not be the last. McKiernan repeated a previous request for an extra 10,000 in Afghanistan on top of those already announced. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates did not rule out additional US forces, but noted that no additional troops would be sent to Afghanistan until the Obama administration had completed its current strategic review.
At a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Poland, Gates pressed NATO allies for further support for Afghanistan. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer warned that NATO could not “afford the price of failure in Afghanistan” and urged “all members of the team… to pull closer together and pull harder in 2009”. But the commitments made were cosmetic, underlining the continuing deep tensions inside NATO between the US and European powers such as Germany and France.
UK Defence Secretary John Hutton complained that Britain was already doing its share, saying that “the European members of NATO need to do more”. Italy promised 500 soldiers. Germany indicated that it may send an additional 600 troops, but to the largely peaceful north of Afghanistan to assist with elections due in August. France committed no extra soldiers. While expressing his disappointment at the lack of extra forces, Gates urged NATO members to contribute economic aid and to the training of Afghan security forces.
The NATO summit highlighted the intersection of the war in Afghanistan with growing rivalry in Central Asia. One day before the meeting, the Kyrgyzstan parliament voted to shut down a key US air base needed to supply US and NATO forces in land-locked Afghanistan. As supply lines through neighbouring Pakistan have come under fierce attack from anti-US insurgents, the Pentagon has been seeking alternative routes through Central Asia.
Russia, however, has made clear that any shipment of US supplies through the region will depend on its support and will involve US concessions, particularly over the positioning of US anti-ballistic missiles in NATO-allied countries in Eastern Europe. Before the decision to shut down the Manus Air Base, Moscow announced a substantial aid package to Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, Russia has permitted some non-military US supplies to pass through Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—the first trainload left on Thursday.
The issue is creating divisions within NATO. The US-based think tank Stratfor commented: “The lack of enthusiasm for the Afghanistan surge was matched by growing questions among the Europeans over the military plan itself—both the overarching strategy and the lines of supply. Moreover, the Europeans are anxious to know how and to what extent the US plan involves the Russians.” While France and Germany support a rapprochement with Russia, Eastern European countries are opposed to any deal that would weaken US protection against Moscow.
The US confronts a deteriorating military situation in Afghanistan. Commenting on the boost to US troop numbers, General McKiernan said: “What this allows us to do is change the dynamics of the security situation, predominantly in southern Afghanistan, where we are, at best, stalemated.” He added: “I have to tell you that 2009 is going to be a tough year.”
Other US analysts are less cautious in their warnings. John Nagl, from the Centre for a New American Security, told the British Observer that the number of US soldiers in Afghanistan could eventually rise to 100,000. “The immediate problem is to stop the bleeding. The 30,000 troops is a tourniquet… [but] that is all we have. If Obama is a two-term president then by the end of his time in office there may only be marine embassy guards in Iraq. But there will still be tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan.”
In a detailed statement to a US Congressional committee last week, Anthony Cordesman from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies bluntly warned that “we are losing the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan and we have at most two years in which to decisively reverse the situation”. He cited military statistics for 2008 pointing to a 33 percent rise in military clashes with insurgents, an increase in roadside bombs of 27 percent and in surface-to-air fire of 67 percent.
Cordesman stressed, however, that such details were secondary to the growing influence of the Taliban and other anti-occupation militias in Afghanistan. He cited in some detail the results of an ABC poll, released this month, which demonstrated falling support in Afghanistan for the occupation, and for its puppet President Hamid Karzai. Just 18 percent supported any increase in US and NATO troops and 44 percent wanted a reduction.
Support for the Taliban was strongest in the south and east of the country, where Pashtun tribes have been subjected to more than seven years of searches, arbitrary detention, military attacks and bombing. Overall, 25 percent of Afghans felt that violent attacks on occupation forces were justified; in the top five high-conflict provinces, the figure rose to 38 percent.
The survey also provided evidence of deteriorating living standards. The proportion of Afghans who characterised their economic opportunities as “very bad” doubled from 17 percent in 2006 to 33 percent. More than half reported an income of less than $US100 a month and 93 percent less than $300. Many registered complaints about fuel prices, lack of electricity, medical care, roads and other infrastructure. Nearly three quarters of respondents were worried about the impact of the global economic crisis.
Far from addressing any of these issues, the surge in US troops in Afghanistan will compound the anger and resentment that is providing a steady stream of recruits to the anti-occupation insurgency. Most of the fresh troops will be assigned to south of the country, where control by US forces and the Karzai government is tenuous, and to the border with Pakistan in an effort to halt the infiltration of Taliban fighters from bases in Pakistan.
The US war in Afghanistan has already spread across the Pakistani border, destabilising the government in Islamabad. The Obama administration has continued US missile strikes from unmanned drones on targets inside Pakistan’s tribal areas along the border, killing scores of civilians and inflaming local anger. Proof that at least some of the US drones are operating from a base inside Pakistan will compound the political difficulties facing the government, which has previously disclaimed any knowledge or involvement. The London-based Times and the Pakistani News have both published Google Earth images of three drones parked at the Shamsi air field in southwestern Pakistan.
Under pressure from Washington, the Pakistani army has been fighting a war to suppress anti-US militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Some 120,000 troops have been involved, and more than 1,500 have been killed in the fighting. The army, which has received around $10 billion in US aid, has laid waste to towns and villages, causing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee. The insurgency has also spread beyond the FATA to areas of the North West Frontier Province, including the Swat Valley, and is even touching on the Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous state.
Pakistan announced this week that it had struck a shaky deal with insurgents in the Swat Valley to introduce Islamic Sharia law to the area as part of a ceasefire. Richard Holbrooke, US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the media that the Obama administration was concerned that “the truce does not turn into a surrender”. He said he had spoken to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari who had assured him that was “not the case” and described the deal as “an interim arrangement”.
US Defence Secretary Gates took a slightly different tack, saying on Friday that the agreement was acceptable if it led to reconciliation and the disarming of the insurgents. He made clear that the US was looking to similar arrangements with sections of the anti-occupation forces in Afghanistan, seeking to replicate the tactic used in Iraq to buy off local tribal leaders and use them against hard-line insurgents. “We have said all along that ultimately some sort of political reconciliation has to be part of the long-term solution in Afghanistan,” Gates said.
Washington’s neo-colonial occupation of Afghanistan, however, is confronting widespread hostility and a burgeoning armed resistance. Asked about the ability of the US to succeed where the British army in the nineteenth century and the Soviet military in the 1980s had failed, General McKiernan simply said that it was “a very unhealthy comparison”. The comparison is perfectly apt. Like the British Raj and the Soviet Stalinist bureaucracy, Washington is pursuing a criminal war for the subjugation of Afghanistan and the pursuit of US economic and strategic ambitions in Central Asia. Now, thousands more US soldiers are being sent into a quagmire that shows no signs of ending.


Obama and the Counterinsurgency Era
February 21, 2009By Anthony Fenton | Asia Times Online, February 21, 2009
Early signals indicate that United States President Barack Obama will continue driving the “counter-insurgency era” that began under his predecessor George W Bush.
Less than one month into his administration, the most significant indicators that Obama will continue implementing a foreign policy transformation that began under the Bush administration may be found in and around his National Security appointments. Strikingly, the very rhetoric that is being used to signify change is representative of this continuity.
The first key signal came on December 1, when Obama confirmed that he would continue with Robert M Gates as secretary of defense. That day, Obama also announced that (retired) marine general James L Jones would become his national security advisor, and that Hillary Clinton would be secretary of state.
Subsequent appointments, including (retired) navy admiral Dennis Blair to director of national intelligence, and Michele Flournoy as under secretary of defense for policy, along with keeping Michael Vickers on at under secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, are all linked to Obama’s assurances that “irregular warfare” will remain at the forefront of US policy, strategy and operations for the foreseeable future.
To help solidify matters, on December 1, Gates quietly signed Department of Defense
Directive (DoDD) 3000.07, establishing the policy that “irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare”. [1]
According to the directive, irregular warfare (IW) encompasses “Counter-terrorism operations, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, and stability operations”.
Under 3000.07, Vickers, a former special forces and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative who is considered one of the key architects behind the CIA’s covert war with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, becomes Gates’ “principal advisor” on irregular warfare and the person who will provide “overall policy oversight” to ensure the US military establishment is transformed to be “as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare”.
Directive 3000.07 builds on a post-9/11 foreign policy establishment transformation that began with the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002. According to counter-insurgency theorist (retired) colonel Thomas Baltazar and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Elisabeth Kvitashvili, the NSS of 2002 “emphasized a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to the war on terrorism”. [2]
“Whole of government” is a key term that has stuck, and is increasingly being used by the Pentagon and the counter-insurgency community.
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, released by the Department of Defense in January 2009, calls for “a better balance between our Nation’s hard and soft power”, a shift which “requires exploring whole-of-government approaches for meeting complex security challenges”. [3]
Directive 3000.07 also built on former president George W Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 and secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld’s DoDD 3000.05, both issued in late 2005. These directives had already placed Stability Operations on par with traditional operations. Likewise, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006, and the publication and mass promotion of the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) also demonstrated an increasing emphasis on IW. [4] [5]
Counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen (at the time, a key State Department advisor) said in a speech at the US Government Counter-insurgency Conference in September 2006, “True enough, the words ‘insurgency’, ‘insurgent’ or ‘counterinsurgency’ do not appear in NSPD 44, but it clearly envisages the need to deploy integrated whole-of-government capabilities in hostile environments.”
Other key, IW-related developments during the Bush administration included former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy” initiative. Announced in January 2006, it called for “a more cooperative working relationship between American diplomats and the US military”. [6] An equally seminal moment took place in November of 2007, when Gates delivered the Landon Lecture, during which he made the “case for strengthening our capacity to use ‘soft’ power and for better integrating it with ‘hard’ power.” [7]
The integration of “soft” and “hard” power is known as “smart power”, a concept that is generally credited to Joseph Nye, a member of the US foreign policy elite, and former official under presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. But it is the 2006 CSIS Commission on Smart Power report, which Nye co-chaired, that is more likely the source for the shift in rhetoric that would be introduced by Gates and then used by the Obama administration. [8]
The fundamental argument of the report was that “the most important mandate” for the next administration would be to re-brand the US image in order that the dwindling Empire might “move from eliciting fear and anger to inspiring optimism and hope”.
Optimism and hope, under the overarching if nebulous theme of “change” were key messages of Obama’s presidential campaign. Among the major goals laid out by the report is “to prolong and preserve American pre-eminence as an agent for good”.
The report asserts that the US “cannot abandon” its military, but that it needs to strengthen the tools of soft power, which include diplomacy and development aid. The report acknowledges that the shift to “smart power” had already begun under Bush, writing: “Some elements of this approach are already occurring in the conduct of ongoing counter-insurgency, nation building, and counter-terrorism operations – tasks that depend critically but only partially on hard power.”
As with many soul-searching debates into the strategic countenance of the US over the years, this one hinges on questions of legitimacy and “credibility”. For the authors, it is not the formulation of the war on terror itself that is problematic in so much as “strik[ing] a balance between the use of force against irreconcilable extremists … and other means of countering terrorism.”
While the “war on terror” is seen as “likely to be with us for decades”, the next administration needed to find “a new central premise for US foreign policy to replace the war on terror”.
The new “central premise” appears to have already emerged. On February 6, the Pakistani press reported that Senator John Kerry, the new chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, bristled at the “the use of the term ‘war on terror'”. Rather, according to Kerry, “What we are doing is conducting global counter-insurgency.” [9]
One of the key “guiding principles” that the CSIS commission suggested to the incoming administration was to “elevate and integrate … development, diplomacy and public diplomacy into unified whole”.
The shift to an emphasis on “whole of government” capabilities (sometimes referred to as “inter-agency”, or “three-D” capabilities) is highlighted in other emerging policies and key reports.
In July 2008, the USAID released its “Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy”. Therein, USAID describes itself as being “designed to facilitate a whole-of-government approach in which US government agencies work … to provide a coordinated, consistent response in pursuit of shared policy goals.” USAID also notes in the policy how its efforts are “a key element of any successful … counter-insurgency effort”. [10]
Likewise, the touchstone US Government Counter-insurgency Guide had its signing ceremony on January 13. The three signatories were USAID administrator Henrietta Fore, Secretary of Defense Gates, and outgoing secretary of state
Rice. In the Guide’s preface, State Department Counselor, and Project for a New American Century signatory Eliot A Cohen asserts that “insurgency will be a large and growing element of the security challenges faced by the Unites States in the 21st century”. The COIN Guide is to prepare key government agencies for the “near certainty” that the US will be engaged in COIN [counter-insurgency] operations “during the decades to come”. [11]
Other key responsibilities under DoDD 3000.07 were given to the undersecretary for defense policy (USD-P), a position that is now held by Michele A Flournoy, the former president of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) think-tank. When it was announced that Flournoy would become USD-P, the Washington Independent’s Spencer Ackerman referred to her appointment as “a victory for the coterie of counter-insurgency thinkers that the think-tank employs and champions”. [12]
In addition to heading CNAS, Flournoy was, together with Jones, Blair, and Nye, a member of the “Guiding Coalition” of another key think-tank close to the Obama administration, the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR).
At the December 1 event announcing his appointment, Jones stressed how “National Security in the 21st century comprises a portfolio which includes all elements of national power and influence working in coordination and harmony towards the desired goal of keeping our nation safe.”
This statement echoed recommendations that would be made only two days later by the PNSR in its bi-partisan report, “Forging a New Shield”. The report’s main recommendation is that “a new national security system in which agencies work together on joint assignments and policy implementation in responding to crises and managing day-to-day national security affairs”.
Modeled on and led by one of key architects of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which restructured the US military bringing all of the forces under one umbrella for the first time, the PNSR seeks to similarly alter the national security apparatus of the US in order that the “whole of government” can more cohesively wage global counter-insurgency.
The PNSR grew out of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the same agency that coordinated the Iraq Study Group and the lower-profile Afghanistan Study Group. The latter was headed by Jones. One of its key recommendations, that the US increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, began to be adopted by the Bush administration and was a key foreign policy plank of Obama’s electoral campaign. Upon taking office, Obama quickly implemented another ASG recommendation by naming Richard Holbrooke as his special advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan. [13]
On January 13, 2009, PNSR announced that they had received $4 million from Congress via the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Department of Defense. Both ODNI, led by former PNSR co-chair Dennis Blair, and the DoD “will oversee execution of the agreement”. [14]
The close proximity of the PNSR to the new administration is instructive for another important reason.
In 2006, army General David Petraeus and Marine Lieutenant General James Mattis established the Counter-insurgency (COIN) Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “to facilitate the development of a culture that enables us to more effectively adapt as a whole government when called upon to deal with future COIN or COIN-like threats”. [15]
According to the COIN Center’s official pamphlet, its purpose is “to better educate and train all US ground forces on the principles and practices of counter-insurgency, and to better integrate COIN efforts among the services”.
Among members of the COIN Center’s “community of interest” listed on its website, is the PNSR. Additionally, in its pamphlet, the COIN Center lists both a current program and a “near term initiative” that it is collaborating on with the PNSR. It remains to be seen what role exactly the PNSR will play with the COIN Center. One clue is found in the COIN Center pamphlet which states:
The analytical construct the COIN Center uses for continued analysis of distributed responsibility for issues in a COIN environment is the acronym “DDD” or the “3Ds”: Diplomacy (State); Development (USAID); and Defense (DoD).” [16] That PNSR has a shared emphasis on the interagency, or 3D, process, which may be an indication of collaborative efforts to watch for.
One reason to be wary of the commitment to “irregular warfare” is that it reflects a warning issued recently by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen, that US foreign policy is “too militarized”. Although the lip service paid to “smart power” might be seen to indicate a balancing effect toward civilian influence over foreign policy, the appointment of retired military
and intelligence figures to key civilian posts calls this into question. [17]
Since the Obama administration campaigned on the continuity of counter-insurgency and irregular war as key elements of US power projection under his administration, it is likely that these policies will attain a level of popular support not experienced by the Bush administration, and will see little critical scrutiny by the media. The challenge will be to shed light on and critically examine these policies as they manifest in any number of settings around the world in the days to come.
Notes
1. Department of Defense directive number 3000.07, December 1, 2008.
2 . Baltazar, Colonel Thomas and Elisabeth Kvitashvili, “The Role of USAID and Development Assistance in Combatting Terrorism,” Military Review, March-April 2007, pp. 38-40.
3. Pentagon Recommends ‘Whole-of-Government’ National Security Plans by Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, Monday, February 2, 2009.
4. National Security Presidential directive NSPD-44 December 7, 2005.
5. DoD directive 3000.05 November 28, 2005.
6. Better Jointness Needed Between Military and Diplomats , Rice Says By Steven Donald Smith. American Forces Press Service, January 18, 2006.
7. Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M Gates, Manhattan , Kansas, Monday, November 26, 2007.
8. CSIS Commission on Smart Power.
9. Kerry says Pakistan aid bill to be passed shortly, APP Feb 6.
10. Civilian-military cooperation policy July 2008.
11. US government counterinsurgency guide
12.Obama’s Pentagon Subcabinet Officials: Lynn, Flournoy by Spencer Ackerman, The Washington Independent, 1/8/09.
13. Afghanistan Study Group report
14.PNSR Hails Appointment of Guiding Coalition Members to Obama Administration
15.COIN Center Community Of Interest
16.US Army/US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center.
17. Foreign Policy Beyond the Pentagon by Walter Pincus The Washington Post, February 9, 2009.
Anthony Fenton is an independent researcher and journalist based near Vancouver, Canada. He is currently co-writing a book on Canadian-US post-9/11 foreign policy integration and transformation, and can be reached at fenton@shaw.ca.
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