By LIAQUAT ALI KHAN | Counterpunch, August 27, 2008
Pakistan has been unsuccessful in designing a stable presidency. Two competing models vie for approval. Pakistan’s formulaic constitution, borrowed from the legal-political traditions of England and India, establishes a ceremonial presidency subordinated to parliament. The president with few powers is the head of state and represents the unity of the Republic. The ceremonial presidency empowers elected assemblies to run affairs of the state and provinces in accordance with the wishes of the people. It also spawns political cronyism, allowing politicians to freely broker power relations, distribute ministries and governmental offices on the basis of connection rather than competence and, for the worse, use state resources to advance personal and family interests.
The competing model, which Pakistan’s generals as well as American policymakers prefer, institutes a strong presidency – a praetorian presidency – that listens to the armed forces and kow-tows to American interests. Under the praetorian model, the President exercises formidable powers, appoints heads of the armed forces, and can dissolve dysfunctional or discordant elected assemblies. Even the judiciary is made subservient to the President. The praetorian presidency empowers what Pakistanis call the establishment—a congregation of bureaucrats, army generals, advisers, and experts. The praetorian presidency focuses on economy and foreign relations. But it alienates political forces and weakens elected assemblies. Consequently, corruption permeates the state machinery with little or no accountability.
The nomination of Asif Zardari, the widower of assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to contest the presidential election is a disturbing development. If elected, President Zardari would further muddle the models of presidency. Zardari might not use the iron hand of praetorian presidency, as did General Pervez Musharraf, to please the establishment and foreign masters. Under no circumstance, however, will Zardari be the ceremonial president.
Ceremonial Presidency
The ceremonial presidency works best when the president is a non-political, consensus figure enjoying the trust of major political parties. Ideally, the ceremonial president is a person of great stature, unimpeachable character, and favorable reputation. The ceremonial president must not be the head of any political party, nor must the ceremonial president be ideologically inclined toward a certain foreign policy, domestic agenda, or political set up. This apparent neutrality of the ceremonial presidency generates confidence among political forces that the state is open to political diversity and pluralism.
Zardari does not qualify to be a ceremonial president. Though many criminal cases filed against Zardari were fabricated, his reputation is sullied with charges of corruption. His recent conduct to make and break political accords regarding the restoration of judges also leaves the impression that Zardari equates the art of politics with amoral cunningness rather than tough bargaining over controversial issues.
Furthermore, Zardari is politically too powerful to be a ceremonial president. He is the co-chairman of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the party in power. The other chairman is Zardari’s own son. This family hold on the rank and file of the PPP will continue to exist even if Zardari resigns from co-chairmanship. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, a member of the PPP, is unlikely to challenge President Zardari on the theory that the Prime Minster has the constitutional powers to run the country. For all practical purposes, therefore, Zardari will run the country as the top man even if the praetorian presidency is constitutionally dismantled.
Praetorian Presidency
In opposing Musharraf, the PPP was planning to introduce a complex constitutional package in the parliament to cut down powers of the praetorian presidency. Almost all political parties favor restoring the constitution to its formulaic format. This political consensus will now fall apart. If Zardari is elected to be the president, the PPP would most likely withdraw the constitutional package. The constitution, as it stands, confers huge powers on the president. Zardari would want to retain these powers in case the political tide turns against him or the PPP.
Even the United States would prefer that the constitution remains as is, and that the praetorian presidency is not weakened. It is easier for the U.S. to deal with one strong man at the top than with an elected parliament accountable to the people. The U.S. can fight the war in Afghanistan more effectively if Pakistan furnishes its intelligence and armed resources to defeat the Taliban and foreign fighters. Pakistan’s praetorian presidency can deliver these resources to satisfy U.S. interests in the region, including the pressure on Iran. Zardari, a powerful man who cannot overcome the reputation of being a crook, is a godsend for the U.S. In the past, the U.S. has deftly exploited praetorian characters, such as Manual Noriega, Saddam Hussein, the Shah of Iran, and Pervez Musharraf, for its global interests.
Pakistan under Zardari
Regardless of whether the constitution is restored to ceremonial presidency, Pakistan is in for a rough ride under Zardari. Now that the coalition has split, Zardari’s personal character will be politicized, highlighting his past criminal record. A sullied civilian president will diminish the nation’s confidence in political rule. The insurgents in Pakistan’s tribal areas will intensify their battle against the government, increasing suicide bombings. The war in Afghanistan will spill over the border into Pakistan, as the U.S. daringly strikes the terrorist infrastructure on both sides of the border. Engaged in inter-personal politics, the government will have little time to solve the nation’s basic problems, including shortages of electricity, fuel, and clean water.
Ali Khan is professor of law at Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas, and the author of the book, A Theory of Universal Democracy (2003).
Extraordinary Rendition, Extraordinary Mistake
August 31, 2008Sangitha McKenzie Millar | Foreign Policy In Focus, August 29, 2008
Mamdouh Habib, an Australian citizen, was living in Sydney with his wife and four children when he took a trip alone to Pakistan to find a home for his family. When Habib boarded a bus for the Islamabad airport to return home, Pakistani police seized him and took him to a police station, where he was subjected to various crude torture techniques, including electric shocks and beating. At one point, he was forced to hang by the arms above a drum-like mechanism that administered an electric shock when touched. Pakistani police asked him repeatedly if he was with al-Qaeda, and if he trained in Afghanistan. Habib responded “No” over and over until he passed out.
After 15 days in the Pakistani prison, Habib was transferred to U.S. agents who flew him to Cairo. When he arrived, Omar Solaimon, chief of Egyptian security, informed him that Egypt receives $10 million for every confessed terrorist they hand over to the United States. Habib stated that during his five months in Egypt, “there was no interrogation, only torture.” His skin was burned with cigarettes and he was threatened with dogs, beaten, and repeatedly shocked with a stun gun. During this time, he heard American voices in the prison, but Egyptians were in charge of the torture. In Michael Otterman’s book American Torture: From the Cold War to Abu Ghraib and Beyond (Pluto Press 2007), Habib said he was drugged and began to hallucinate: “I feel like a dead person. I was gone. I become crazy.” He remembers admitting things to interrogators, anything they asked: “I didn’t care … at this point I was ready to die.”
He was transferred back to the custody of U.S. agents in May 2002. They flew him first to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and then to Kandahar. After several weeks, American agents sent Habib to Guantánamo Bay. Three British detainees who have since been released from the prison described Habib as being in a “catastrophic state” when he arrived. Most of his fingernails were missing and he regularly bled from the nose, mouth, and ears while he slept.
Habib was held at Guantánamo Bay until late 2004, when he was charged with training 9/11 hijackers in martial arts, attending an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, and transporting chemical weapons. A Chicago human rights lawyer took his case and detailed all of Habib’s allegations of torture in court documents. After the case garnered national attention through a front page story in The Washington Post, Habib became a liability for the U.S. government. Rather than have his testimony on the torture he suffered in Egypt become a matter of public record, U.S. officials decided to send him back to Sydney in January 2005 – over three years after seizing him in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, Habib’s case isn’t unusual. There’s substantial evidence that the United States routinely and knowingly “outsources” the application of torture by transferring terrorism suspects to countries that frequently violate international human rights norms. As details of the extraordinary rendition program have emerged, politicians, journalists, academics, legal experts, and policymakers have raised serious objections to the policy. It has captured the attention of U.S. legislators, and both the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations as well as the House Committee on the Judiciary have held hearings to analyze the policy and examine related cases. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Democratic vice presidential nominee, expressed concern that “rendition, as currently practiced, is undermining our moral credibility and standing abroad and weakening the coalitions with foreign governments that we need to effectively combat international terrorism.” As the public continues to learn more about the program, calls to end extraordinary rendition have increased, and the next presidential administration will likely be forced to take a stand one way or another on the issue.
Continued . . .
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