Archive for the ‘US policy’ Category

Wrong on Afghanistan!

April 4, 2009

Sometimes I feel like I am reliving the era of President Lyndon B. Johnson. The era of ‘guns and butter,’ as they called it. At the same time that Johnson was launching his ‘War on Poverty’ he was escalating the US war against the people of Vietnam and Laos, as well as carrying out the criminal invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965). Not only did these interventions (and others!) isolate the USA and set back the efforts of these various countries at self- determination, but they wrecked the US economy, siphoning off badly needed resources.

So, here we are today with the Obama administration carrying out a cautious and VERY partial withdrawal from Iraq (50,000 US troops will remain), while at the same time escalating the US troop presence in Afghanistan. Compounding this situation are US military attacks within Pakistan, an activity that is the equivalent of pouring kerosene on an open fire.

And just like President Johnson, President Obama has an ambitious domestic agenda.

It has been difficult for many liberals and progressives to outright oppose the Afghanistan war. This was true when Bush first invaded in 2001, and it remains true today. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, many people in the USA, including but not limited to the Bush administration, were looking for revenge. In fact, there were those who said quite explicitly that revenge should take precedence over justice. And so we got it- revenge that is.

The Afghanistan war was never a ‘good war.’ Yes, Al Qaeda had bases in Afghanistan. So, let’s think about another situation and how it was handled. The Nicaraguan Contras, the US-backed terrorists who waged a war against the Sandinista government in the 1980s, were based in Honduras. The Honduran government did not control those bases, even if they turned a blind-eye to them. And, to emphasize the point, the Contras were supplied, resupplied, and further supplied by the US government. In fact, the USA mined Nicaraguan harbors, a clear act of war by one government against another.

So, should the Sandinistas have attacked Honduras, overthrown the Honduran government, and perhaps have attacked Miami for good measure? How do you think that much of the world would have responded? In fact, the Sandinistas went to the World Court and brought charges against the USA. The Nicaraguans prevailed in the Court, to the surprise of everyone, yet it did not matter because the USA ignored the judgment of the Court.

The Taliban government of Afghanistan, as despicable as they were, did not carry out the assault on 11 September 2001. It was easier, however, for Bush to carry out a conventional assault against the people that only a few short months prior they had been treating as potential business partners. In carrying out that invasion the US walked into a quagmire that anyone who studied Central Asia could have (and many had) predicted. In fact, the Soviet Union had a horrific experience in Afghanistan a dozen years earlier.

So, now we are being told that the USA must continue its ‘good war’ in Afghanistan in order to crush the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The problem is that when something starts off wrong, it rarely gets much better. In fact, not only has the military situation been worsening due to a combination of bungling, corruption and cultural blindness by the invaders, but the regional political situation has been deteriorating.
A popular movement in Pakistan brought an end to the military regime of President Musharaff. At the same time, right-wing Islamists began their own military actions against the Pakistan government, the US, Pakistani Shiites, and, when they had some free time, the Indian government. It should be noted that these are not the same Taliban as are operating in Afghanistan, but these distinctions never seem to matter to the USA. Each time the USA carries out a drone attack on alleged terrorist positions in Pakistan, they strengthen the arguments and support of the right-wing Islamists.

Further US involvement in Afghanistan brings no assurance of victory. More importantly, the conflict must be resolved politically. The puppet regime in Kabul has so alienated the population that they have little control outside of the city itself. The population which, in some cases welcomed the US invasion has turned against the US and their NATO and warlord allies even if they have no love for the Taliban. There is nothing that should lead anyone to believe that this will change with the introduction of even more US forces, even if the USA spreads money around the way that they did in Iraq in order to buy off opposition.

It is not just that furthering the Afghanistan aggression takes badly needed funds away from domestic projects in the USA. That should be a given. More importantly, the Afghanistan situation is integrally linked to the internal situation in Pakistan as well as the Pakistani conflict with India (over the Kashmir). There is little that the Obama administration is currently doing that seems to recognize the extent of the potential spillover affect from further military escalation. This in a region where there are two nuclear powers within minutes of turning each other into ashes, and seem to be driven toward this end.

[BlackCommentator.com Executive Editor, Bill Fletcher, Jr., is a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies, the immediate past president of TransAfrica Forum and co-author of, Solidarity Divided: The Crisis in Organized Labor and a New Path toward Social Justice (University of California Press), which examines the crisis of organized labor in the USA.]


Judge Rules Some Prisoners at Bagram Have Right of Habeas Corpus

April 4, 2009

by Charlie Savage | The New York Times, April 3, 2009

WASHINGTON – A federal judge ruled on Thursday that some prisoners held by the United States military in Afghanistan have a right to challenge their imprisonment, dealing a blow to government efforts to detain terrorism suspects for extended periods without court oversight.

[Attiqullah 10, son of Hafizullah Shahbaz Khiel, an Afghan detainee shows documents proclaiming Hafizullah's innocence during an interview with Associated Press at his uncle's house on the outskirts of Kabul,Afghanistan, Tuesday, Jan 20, 2009. He is being held at Bagram Air Base.(AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)  ]Attiqullah 10, son of Hafizullah Shahbaz Khiel, an Afghan detainee shows documents proclaiming Hafizullah’s innocence during an interview with Associated Press at his uncle’s house on the outskirts of Kabul,Afghanistan, Tuesday, Jan 20, 2009. He is being held at Bagram Air Base.(AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)

In a 53-page ruling that rejected a claim of unfettered executive power advanced by both the Bush and Obama administrations, United States District Judge John D. Bates said that three detainees at the United States’ Bagram Air Base had the same legal rights that the Supreme Court last year granted to prisoners held at the American naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.The three detainees – two Yemenis and a Tunisian – say that they were captured outside Afghanistan and taken to Bagram, and that they have been imprisoned for more than six years without trials. Arguing that they were not enemy combatants, the detainees want a civilian judge to review the evidence against them and order their release, under the constitutional right of habeas corpus.

The importance of Bagram as a holding site for terrorism suspects captured outside Afghanistan and Iraq has increased under the Obama administration, which prohibited the Central Intelligence Agency from using its secret prisons for long-term detention and ordered the military prison at Guantánamo closed within a year. The administration had sought to preserve Bagram as a haven where it could detain terrorism suspects beyond the reach of American courts, telling Judge Bates in February that it agreed with the Bush administration’s view that courts had no jurisdiction over detainees there.

Judge Bates, who was appointed by President George W. Bush in 2001, was not persuaded. He said transferring captured terrorism suspects to the prison inside Afghanistan and claiming they were beyond the jurisdiction of American courts “resurrects the same specter of limitless executive power the Supreme Court sought to guard against” in its 2008 ruling that Guantánamo prisoners have a right to habeas corpus.

Dean Boyd, a Justice Department spokesman, said that the administration was reviewing the decision and that it had made no decision about whether to appeal.

Judge Bates emphasized that his ruling was “quite narrow.” He said that it did not apply to prisoners captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, and that a determination of whether prisoners might challenge their detention in court would depend on a case-by-case analysis of factors like their citizenship and location of capture.

“It is one thing to detain those captured on the surrounding battlefield at a place like Bagram, which respondents correctly maintain is in a theater of war,” the judge wrote. “It is quite another thing to apprehend people in foreign countries – far from any Afghan battlefield – and then bring them to a theater of war, where the Constitution arguably may not reach.”

Moreover, the judge has put off ruling that a fourth prisoner – also captured outside Afghanistan, but holding Afghan citizenship – had a right to challenge his detention. He said any order to release the detainee could lead to frictions with the Afghan government, and asked for additional briefings on that case.

The United States is holding about 600 people at Bagram without charges and in spartan conditions. United States officials have never provided a full accounting of the prison population, but an American government official, speaking on condition of anonymity because it is against policy to discuss details of the Bagram prison, said that fewer than a dozen detainees fell into the category affected by the ruling – non-Afghans captured beyond Afghan borders.

Judge Bates has been involved in several high-profile executive power cases. In 2002, he sided with the Bush administration in a lawsuit over whether Vice President Dick Cheney’s energy task force records were required to be disclosed. But in 2008, he sided with Congress in an executive-privilege dispute over whether top aides to Mr. Bush were immune from subpoenas related to the firing of federal prosecutors.

David Rivkin, an associate White House counsel in the administration of the first President Bush, predicted that Judge Bates’s ruling would be overturned on appeal. He warned that the ruling “gravely undermined” the country’s “ability to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities worldwide.”

But Tina Foster, the executive director of the International Justice Network, which is representing the four Bagram detainees, praised Judge Bates’s decision as “a very good day for the Constitution and the rule of law.”

Ms. Foster said that the Bagram ruling meant that changes to the Bush detention policies would go beyond merely closing Guantánamo and extend “to any place where the United States seeks to hold individuals in a legal black hole.”

The power of federal judges to review decisions by the executive branch to imprison a terrorism suspect was among the most contentious legal issues that arose after the 2001 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration began a policy of holding prisoners indefinitely and without trials, arguing that federal judges had no authority to second-guess its decisions about whom to name an “enemy combatant.”

But human-rights lawyers challenged those policies, winning Supreme Court decisions in 2004, 2006 and 2008 that gradually expanded the reach of the American legal system over detainees.

After taking office, Mr. Obama ordered a review of the evidence against each of the roughly 240 prisoners at Guantánamo as a first step toward closing the prison within a year.

He did not extend the steps he was taking to resolve the fate of the Guantánamo prisoners to those held at Bagram, although a comprehensive review of detainee policies is due to be completed in July. Ms. Foster said that the Bagram case may force the administration to speed up its decisions.

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.

US drone hits Pakistan compound

April 4, 2009

Al Jazeera, April 4, 2009

There has been growing anger in Pakistan
against US aerial attacks [EPA]

Up to 13 people have been killed in a suspected US drone attack in Pakistan’s North Waziristan region near the Afghan border, security officials say.

The attack on Saturday occurred in an area 35km west of the region’s main town of Miranshah.

The death toll is 13, including some foreigners, but  information is very sketchy because it’s a town which is very  remote,” one security official said on condition of anonymity.

Pakistani officials use the word “foreigner” to refer to suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, but the precise identities of the dead was not confirmed.

A local official said the compound that was hit belonged to Tariq Khan, who was described as a “facilitator of the Taliban”.

Amir Shah, a resident of Waziristan, said drones were still flying over the area several hours after the attack.

‘Safe haven’

With violence intensifying in Afghanistan, the US has launched more drone attacks on the Pakistani side of the border to destroy what it describes as “safe havens” for anti-government fighters.

The Pakistani government has protested to Washington against the drone strikes, saying they violated its territorial sovereignty.

But the US has kept up with its aerial attacks, accusing Islamabad of not doing enough to crack down on fighters who cross the border to attack US and Nato troops in Afghanistan.

Hundreds of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters sought refuge in Pakistan’s northwest tribal region after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban regime in late 2001.

US seeks Nato boost for Afghan war

April 3, 2009

Al Jazeera, April 3, 2009

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Nato secretary-general, steps down in July [Reuters]

Barack Obama, the US president, is to meet the French president and German chancellor in an attempt to convince them to send extra troops to Afghanistan, before a Nato summit likely to focus on the alliance’s role there.

Obama will talk to Nicolas Sarkozy in Strasbourg on Friday before crossing into Germany to meet Angela Merkel, hours before the summit opens in the German town of Baden-Baden.

The US president is set to unveil more details of his plan to tackle a resurgent Taliban-led opposition in Afghanistan and Pakistan at the summit.

Demonstrations were held on the eve of the summit on Thursday, with French police making about 300 arrests amid heavy clashes in Strasbourg, where the summit’s key discussions will be held.

At least 107 people arrested in the protests are still being held, French police have said.

Troops sought

After Obama introduces his Afghanistan strategy to Nato members, he is expected to call for greater support on troop deployments needed to bolster his plan.

In depth

What is France’s Nato role
Al Jazeera joins French troops on the Afghan front

European nations have been reluctant to commit extra troops to Afghanistan in support of about 70,000 mostly Nato soldiers already stationed there.”The United States has already said that it will deploy another 17,000 troops to the country, which was followed up by an announcement that another 4,000 US troops will be going there to train Afghan security forces,” Hamish MacDonald, Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Strasbourg, said.

“What we will see over the coming days is the US lobbying very hard to see European allies send more troops as well. Whether or not they will do that is another question entirely.”

However, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, said on Friday that Obama will not push Nato members on the numbers of troops they can deploy.

“The Nato summit is not a pledging conference,” she said.

Obama’s national security adviser is confident that Nato members will agree to send extra forces eventually.

General James Jones had said on Thursday: “It would be wrong to conclude that we will not get any contributions, either manpower or resources, because I think that’s not going to be the case.”

Russia relations

Jones praised efforts by Joe Biden, the US vice-president, Clinton and other US officials to consult Nato allies in advance of the introduction of Obama’s Afghanistan strategy.

“I think there’s a feeling that we’re all in this together, and we’ll wait and see exactly how far that takes us,” he said.

Russia’s war in Georgia has highlighted tensions between Nato and Moscow [AFP]

“But having been at Nato and having been around since 2003 working on Afghanistan, I can tell you that there is a new spirit and there’s a new feeling.”The summit, which marks Nato’s 60th anniversary, will also examine the alliance’s relations with Russia, which deteriorated after Moscow’s war with Georgia in August.

The Russian government has repeatedly stressed its opposition to what it calls the creeping of Nato into what Moscow deems its traditional sphere of influence.

Both Georgia and Ukraine, which were members of the former Soviet Union, have in recent months signalled their intention to join Nato.

Pavel Felgenhauer, a defence analyst and columnist for the Moscow-based Novaya Gazeta newspaper, told Al Jazeera that Russia may consider helping Nato in its mission in Afghanistan if the alliance refrains from expanding towards the Russian border.

“Russia does not like Nato much but it also does not like the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is Nato’s main enemy. Right now, Russia is ready to help Nato in Afghanistan but Nato will have to take into account certain interests [of Russia].

“There is a degree of tension and most of that is because of [the war in] Georgia. For Russia, Nato is not seen as a separate player but a continuation of Washington. Moscow does not want Nato to expand into the post-Soviet space and take on Georgia and Ukraine.

“Moscow wants to see a kind of working relationship. When we give our help with logistics in Afghanistan it must come in exchange for Nato not moving into our back yard.”

“Af-Pak: Obama’s War”

April 3, 2009

by Immanuel Wallerstein ,  commentary No. 254, April 1, 2009

Af-Pak is the new acronym the U.S. government has invented for Afghanistan-Pakistan. Its meaning is that there is a geopolitical concern of the United States in which the strategy that the United States wishes to pursue involves both countries simultaneously and they cannot be considered separately. The United States has emphasized this policy by appointing a single Special Representative to the two countries, Richard Holbrooke.

It was George W. Bush who sent U.S. troops into Afghanistan. And it was George W. Bush who initiated the policy of using U.S. drones to bomb sites in Pakistan. But, now that Barack Obama, after a “careful policy review,” has embraced both policies, it has become Barack Obama’s war. This comes as no enormous surprise since, during the presidential campaign, Obama indicated that he would do these things. Still, now he has done it.

This decision is likely to be seen in retrospect as Obama’s single biggest decision concerning U.S. foreign policy, one that will be noticed by future historians as imprinting its stamp on his reputation. And it is likely to be seen as well as his single biggest mistake. For, as Vice-President Biden apparently warned in the inner policy debate on the issue, it is likely to be a quagmire from which it will be as easy to disengage as the Vietnam war.

There are therefore two questions. Why did he do it? And what are likely to be the consequences during his term of office?

Let us begin with his own explanation of why he did it. He said that “the situation is increasingly perilous,” that “the future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan,” and that “for the American people, [Pakistan’s] border region [with Afghanistan] has become the most dangerous place in the world.”

And why is it so dangerous? Quite simply, it is because it is a safe haven for al-Qaeda to “train terrorists” and to “plot attacks” – not only against Afghanistan and the United States but everywhere in the world. The fight against al-Qaeda is no longer called the “war on terrorism” but is hard to see the difference. Obama claims that the Bush administration had lost its “focus” and that he has now installed a “comprehensive, new strategy.” In short, Obama is going to do this better than Bush.

What then are the new elements? The United States will send more troops to Afghanistan – 17,000 combat troops and 4000 trainers of the Afghan forces. It will send more money. It proposes to give Pakistan $1.5 billion a year for five years to “build schools and roads and hospitals.” It proposes to send “agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers” to Afghanistan to “develop an economy that isn’t dominated by illicit drugs.” In short, Obama says that he believes that “a campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone.”

However, implicitly unlike Bush, this will not be a “blank check” to the two governments. “Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.” As for Afghanistan, the United States “will seek a new compact with the Afghan government that cracks down on corrupt behavior.” The Afghan and Pakistani governments are pleased to be getting the new resources. They haven’t said that they will meet Obama’s conditions. And Obama hasn’t said what he will do if the two governments don’t meet his conditions.

As for the way forward, Obama asserts that “there will be no peace without reconciliation with former enemies.” Reconciliation? Well, not with the “uncompromising core of the Taliban,” or with al-Qaeda, but with those Taliban “who’ve taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price.” To do this, Obama wants assistance. He proposes to create a new Contact Group that will include not only “our NATO allies” but also “the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran, Russia, India and China.”

The most striking aspect of this major commitment is how little enthusiasm it has evoked around the world. In the United States, it has been applauded by the remnants of the neo-cons and McCain. So far, other politicians and the press have been reserved. Iran, Russia, India, and China have not exactly jumped on the bandwagon. They are particularly cool about the idea of reconciliation with so-called moderate Taliban. And both the Guardian and McClatchy report that the Taliban themselves have reacted by creating unity within their hitherto divided ranks – presumably the opposite of what Obama is trying to achieve.

So, where will we probably be six months from now? There will be more U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and the U.S. commanders will probably say that the 21,000 Obama is sending are not enough. There will be further withdrawals of NATO troops from there – a repeat of the Iraq scenario. There will be further, perhaps more extensive, bombings in Pakistan, and consequently even more intensive anti-American sentiments throughout the country. The Pakistani government will not be moving against the Taliban for at least three reasons. The still very influential ISI component of the Pakistani army actually supports the Taliban. The rest of the army is conflicted and in any case probably too weak to do the job. The government will not really press them to do more because it will only thereby strengthen its main rival party which opposes such action and the result may be another army coup.

In short, the “clear and focused goal” that Obama proposes – “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future” – will probably be further than ever from accomplishment. The question is what can Obama do then? He can “stay the course” (shades of Rumsfeld in Iraq), constantly escalate the troop commitment, while changing the local political leadership (shades of Kennedy/Johnson and Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam), or he can turn tail and pull out (as the United States finally did in Vietnam). He is not going to be cheered for any of these choices.

I have the impression that Obama thinks that his speech left him some wiggle room. I think he will find out rather how few choices he will have that are palatable. I think therefore he made a big, probably irreparable, mistake.

Biden: US won’t lift blockade of Cuba

March 30, 2009
Morning Star Online, Sunday 29 March 2009
HAND OF FRIENDSHIP? The US vice-president is happy to talk to Chile's President Michelle Bachelet but says the US has no plans to stop its persecution of Cuba.

SENIOR US politicians have hinted at better relations with Latin America’s new wave of left-wing governments – except for Cuba.

US Vice-President Joe Biden said on Saturday that the US government has no plans to lift the nearly 50-year-old illegal blockade of the socialist island.

He and President Barack Obama “think that Cuban people should determine their own fate and they should be able to live in freedom,” Mr Biden said after taking part in the Progressive Governance Summit in Chile, a gathering of centre-left leaders from Latin America and Europe.

The vice-president said a “transition” was needed in Washington’s policy but that he was in Chile “to talk about the economy, not Cuba.”

Meanwhile, in Colombia, former US president and Obama ally Bill Clinton told a meeting of the governors of the Inter-American Development Bank to maintain relations with the left-wing governments of Colombia’s neighbours.

Without naming Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, Mr Clinton said that “it shouldn’t be surprising that a reaction to global inequality and America’s withdrawal in the last eight years” under the Bush administration had produced governments “that are either too authoritarian or too hostile to market economics or both.”

The UN general assembly has repeatedly passed resolutions condemning the blockade and calling for it to end.

Washington’s isolation has increased in recent years as new progressive governments across the US’s “back yard” of Latin America and the Caribbean have forged close ties with the ever-defiant Cuban people.

Despite the blockade, Cuba has provided practical solidarity across the developing world.

Mr Biden stressed that the White House was committed to the region.

“President Obama and I are absolutely committed to working closely with our neighbours in the hemisphere,” he said at Chile’s La Moneda presidential palace after meeting President Michelle Bachelet.

At a ceremony in Pretoria on Friday, South African President Kgalema Motlanthe bestowed the gold medal of the Order of the Companions of OR Thambo on Fidel Castro, presenting it to Cuban ambassador Angel Fernandez.

The order, named after former ANC president Oliver Thambo, is South Africa’s highest award for solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle.

It had previously been awarded posthumously to Martin Luther King Jr, Salvador Allende and Mahatma Gandhi.


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The ‘New’ Strategy – Did Obama Expand the War Into Pakistan?

March 29, 2009

Is The Real Change a Massive Escalation Into Pakistan?

Antiwar.com March 29, 2009

When President Barack Obama unveiled his “comprehensive, new strategy” for the war in Afghanistan it struck many how decidedly old most of the strategy looked. A vague justification for throwing more money and troops at the seemingly endless war, bundled with posturing about how vital the war’s success ultimately would be.

But is that the whole story? Was the much-heralded new strategy just about polishing up the same old escalation in Afghanistan and selling it as a change? Perhaps the real novelty in this plan takes place outside of Afghanistan, in neighboring Pakistan.

Indeed, while they emphasize Afghanistan in public comments about this plan, the white paper (PDF) distributed by the White House on the strategy looks decidedly Pakistan-centric. It calls for “a more capable, accountable, and effective government” in Afghanistan, but promises “a vibrant economy” for Pakistan. It pledges to “disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan.”

While promising “A New Way Forward” (not so coincidentally the working title of the 2007 escalation in Iraq), it seems that all roads lead to Pakistan. The government will be getting billions in new aid, the US is committing itself to fight militants in the area (above and beyond the repeated drone attacks). They’re not even ruling out sending ground troops.

So Afghanistan has its new strategy, which is its old strategy with more guys. But maybe the real story here is that President Obama has made the equivalent of a de facto declaration of war against Pakistan’s border regions.

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compiled by Jason Ditz [email the author]

Some Strategists Cast Doubt on Afghan War Rationale

March 29, 2009

Analysis by Gareth Porter* | Inter Press Service News

WASHINGTON, Mar 28 (IPS) – The argument for deeper U.S. military commitment to the Afghan War invoked by President Barack Obama in his first major policy statement on Afghanistan and Pakistan Friday – that al Qaeda must be denied a safe haven in Afghanistan – has been not been subjected to public debate in Washington.

A few influential strategists here have been arguing, however, that this official rationale misstates the al Qaeda problem and ignores the serious risk that an escalating U.S. war poses to Pakistan.

Those strategists doubt that al Qaeda would seek to move into Afghanistan as long as they are ensconced in Pakistan and argue that escalating U.S. drone airstrikes or Special Operations raids on Taliban targets in Pakistan will actually strengthen radical jihadi groups in the country and weaken the Pakistani government’s ability to resist them.

The first military strategist to go on record with such a dissenting view on Afghanistan and Pakistan was Col. T. X. Hammes, a retired Marine officer and author of the 2004 book “The Sling and the Stone”, which argued that the U.S. military faces a new type of warfare which it would continue to lose if it did not radically reorient its thinking. He became more widely known as one of the first military officers to call in September 2006 for Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation over failures in Iraq.

Col. Hammes dissected the rationale for the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan in an article last September on the website of the “Small Wars Journal”, which specialises in counterinsurgency issues. He questioned the argument that Afghanistan had to be stabilised in order to deny al Qaeda a terrorist base there, because, “Unfortunately, al Qaeda has moved its forces and its bases into Pakistan.”

Hammes suggested that the Afghan War might actually undermine the tenuous stability of a Pakistani regime, thus making the al Qaeda threat far more serious. He complained that “neither candidate has even commented on how our actions [in Afghanistan] may be feeding Pakistan’s instability.”

Hammes, who has since joined the Institute for Defence Analysis, a Pentagon contractor, declined to comment on the Obama administration’s rationale for the Afghan War for this article.

Kenneth Pollack, the director of research at the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution, has also expressed doubt about the official argument for escalation in Afghanistan. Pollack’s 2002 book, “The Threatening Storm,” was important in persuading opinion-makers in Washington to support the Bush administration’s use of U.S. military force against the Saddam Hussein regime, and he remains an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

But at a Brookings forum Dec. 16, Pollack expressed serious doubts about the strategic rationale for committing the U.S. military to Afghanistan. Contrasting the case for war in Afghanistan with the one for war in Iraq in 2003, he said, it is “much harder to see the tie between Afghanistan and our vital interests.”

Like Hammes, Pollack argued that it is Pakistan, where al Qaeda’s leadership has flourished since being ejected from Afghanistan, which could clearly affect those vital interests. And additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Pollack pointed out, “are not going to solve the problems of Pakistan.”

Responding to a question about the possibility of U.S. attacks against Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan paralleling the U.S. efforts during the Vietnam War to clean out the Communist “sanctuaries” in Cambodia, Pollack expressed concern about that possibility. “The more we put the troops into Afghanistan,” said Pollack, “the more we are tempted to mount cross-border operations into Pakistan, exactly as we did in Vietnam.”

Pollack cast doubt on the use of either drone bombing attacks or Special Operations commando raids into Pakistan as an approach to dealing with the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. “The only way to do it is to mount a full-scale counterinsurgency campaign,” said Pollack, “which seems unlikely in the case of Pakistan.”

The concern raised by Hammes and Pollack about the war in Afghanistan spilling over into Pakistan paralleled concerns in the U.S. intelligence community about the effect on Pakistan of commando raids by U.S. Special Operations forces based in Afghanistan against targets inside Pakistan. In mid-August 2008, the National Intelligence Council presented to the White House the consensus view of the intelligence community that such Special Forces raids, which were then under consideration, could threaten the unity of the Pakistani military if continued long enough, as IPS reported Sep. 9.

Despite that warning, a commando raid was carried out on a target in South Waziristan Sep. 3, reportedly killing as many as 20 people, mostly apparently civilians. A Pentagon official told Army Times reporter Sean D. Naylor that the raid was in response to cross-border activities by Taliban allies with the complicity of the Pakistani military’s Frontier Corps.

Although that raid was supposed to be the beginning of a longer campaign, it was halted because of the virulence of the political backlash in Pakistan that followed, according to Naylor’s Sep. 29 report. The raid represented “a strategic miscalculation,” one U.S. official told Naylor. “We did not fully appreciate the vehemence of the Pakistani response.”

The Pakistani military sent a strong message to Washington by demonstrating that they were willing to close down U.S. supply routes through the Khyber Pass talking about shooting at U.S. helicopters.

The commando raids were put on hold for the time being, but the issue of resuming them was part of the Obama administration’s policy review. That aspect of the review has not been revealed.

Meanwhile airstrikes by drone aircraft in Pakistan have sharply increased in recent months, increasingly targeting Pashtun allies of the Taliban.

Last week, apparently anticipating one result of the policy review, the New York Times reported Obama and his national security advisers were considering expanding the strikes by drone aircraft from the Tribal areas of Northwest Pakistan to Quetta, Baluchistan, where top Taliban leaders are known to be located.

But Daniel Byman, a former CIA analyst and counter-terrorism policy specialist at Georgetown University, who has been research director on the Middle East at the RAND corporation, told the Times that, if drone attacks were expanded as is now being contemplated, al Qaeda and other jihadist organisations might move “farther and farther into Pakistan, into cities”.

Byman believes that would risk “weakening the government we want to bolster”, which he says is “already to some degree a house of cards.” The Times report suggested that some officials in the administration agree with Byman’s assessment.

The drone strikes are admitted by U.S. officials to be so unpopular with the Pakistani public that no Pakistani government can afford to appear to tolerate them, the Times reported.

But such dissenting views as those voiced by Hammes, Pollack and Byman are unknown on Capital Hill. At a hearing on Afghanistan before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee Thursday, the four witnesses were all enthusiastic supporters of escalation, and the argument that U.S. troops must fight to prevent al Qaeda from getting a new sanctuary in Afghanistan never even came up for discussion.

*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, “Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam”, was published in 2006.

U.S.: Obama Affirms New Focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan

March 28, 2009

By Jim Lobe* | Inter Press Service News

WASHINGTON, Mar 27 (IPS) – In what marks a significant escalation in U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Barack Obama Friday outlined what he called a “comprehensive, new strategy” for the two countries to fight al Qaeda and its local allies.

Flanked by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Pentagon chief Robert Gates, Obama said he will send 4,000 U.S. troops to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces in addition to the 17,000 combat troops that he approved for deployment last month, bringing total U.S. military forces there to some 60,000 by the end of the summer.

He also plans a “dramatic increase” in the number of U.S. civilian officials working in Afghanistan to promote improved governance and economic development there and intends to ask Washington’s NATO partners to match U.S. efforts in that regard. He said Washington will also back a “reconciliation process in every province” designed to persuade the Taliban’s foot soldiers to renounce the group.

For Pakistan, Obama announced his support for legislation pending in Congress that would triple non-military aid – to 1.5 billion dollars for each of the next five years – and provide trade preferences for exports from key conflict zones in both countries.

He also promised increased military aid to Pakistan’s Army, conditioned on its “commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders… (W)e will not provide a blank cheque,” he stressed.

At the same time, he suggested, Washington reserves the right to take unilateral action – presumably in the form of Predator drone or other strikes – against specific targets operating in the tribal regions along the Afghan-Pakistani border. “(W)e will insist that action be taken – one way or another – when we have intelligence about high-level terrorist targets,” he said.

Obama’s speech marks the culmination of a two-month review overseen by a former top South Asia analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Council (NSC), Bruce Riedel, on what candidate Obama last year referred to as “the central front in the war on terror,” or what has come increasingly to be called “AfPak.”

U.S. officials have become increasingly concerned over the past two years both about advances made by the Taliban and radical Islamist groups allied to it in the predominantly Pashtun areas on both sides of the two countries’ borders, as well as the continued de facto safe haven enjoyed by al Qaeda in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where, Obama said, it “is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland…”

The announcement came just days before two key meetings where Washington hopes to gain critical international and regional support for its strategy.

The first, to be convened by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, will take place Mar. 31 at The Hague, and will seek commitments by states in the region, including Iran, as well as traditional donors and agencies, for stabilising and reconstructing Afghanistan. The U.S. delegation will be headed by Clinton and Obama’s special representative on “AfPak”, Amb. Richard Holbrooke.

That will be followed by the annual NATO Summit Apr. 3-4 in France and Germany, where Obama himself is expected to lobby other NATO members, who supply most of the 30,000 that make up the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to maintain or increase their troops commitments to ISAF or, in cases where governments have already decided to draw down their forces, to contribute to Washington’s “surge” of foreign civilian expertise in Afghanistan.

The U.S. also sent an observer to Friday’s meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Moscow where Afghanistan was expected to be a central issue.

Washington’s involvement in all these meetings underlines the new administration’s view that the growing insurgencies in “AfPak” and al Qaeda must be seen as a regional problem, a point repeatedly stressed by Obama Friday, notably when he promised to work with the United Nations to “forge a new Contact Group [at The Hague] for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region – our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations, and Iran; Russia, India and China.”

In his remarks, Obama defined Washington’s goal in “AfPak” narrowly, specifically “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”

But achieving that goal will require a “stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy,” he stressed, that, in effect, is far more ambitious, relying as it does, on both increasing U.S. troop strength and an aid programme to, among other things, double the size of the Afghan army to some 134,000 by 2011; tackle “the booming narcotics trade” through agricultural development and other efforts; and reduce corruption for which the government of President Hamid Karzai has been increasingly criticised here and in Afghanistan.

“To focus on the greatest threat to our people, America must no longer deny resources to Afghanistan because of the war in Iraq,” Obama declared in one of several scarcely veiled criticisms of the failure of the George W. Bush administration to follow up its success in evicting the Taliban from power in late 2001 with a strategy and the resources needed to prevent its comeback.

The ambitiousness of the strategy – essentially to stabilise the politics and economy of two large and historically fractious countries – reflects the apparent victory of those inside the administration who argued that Washington should go beyond a “counter-terrorist” (CT) strategy narrowly focused on eliminating the threat posed by al Qaeda, in major part by capturing or killing its leadership wherever it can be found. Rather, they have urged a “counter-insurgency” (COIN) strategy designed to provide security and other basic needs to the civilian population in order to dry up its base for recruitment and support.

According to various published reports, Vice President Joe Biden and Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg argued for the narrower strategy, while Clinton, Holbrooke, Riedel, and several Pentagon officials, including Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus – who implemented COIN strategy in Iraq – and the new undersecretary of defence for policy, Michelle Flournoy, argued much more was needed.

On Pakistan, Obama’s commitment to condition military aid on the army’s demonstrated commitment to pursue COIN against al Qaeda and its local allies marks a major shift from the Bush administration, which provided Islamabad with some 10 billion dollars of military aid since 9/11, almost all of which was spent on conventional weapons for possible war with India. Obama stressed that Washington would “pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan.”

But whether Obama would follow through on canceling the aid if the Army does not meet the conditions remains to be seen, according to most analysts here. Just this week, the New York Times, for example, reported that operatives from Pakistan’s military intelligence agency have continued to provide support to Taliban commanders in spite of repeated promises by the civilian-led government and the Army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Pavez Kayani, that such ties have been broken. At the same time, the Army has reportedly cooperated with U.S. missile strikes against suspected Taliban and al Qaeda targets, although it has publicly condemned them.

“The toughest part of this is going to be to get the Pakistanis to do what they need to do,” said Lawrence Korb, a former senior Pentagon official at the Centre for American Progress.

Most lawmakers on Capitol Hill Friday rallied around the strategy despite the proposed 50-billion-dollar price tag for the expanded effort in Afghanistan alone over the next year and a half. “President Obama’s new strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan is realistic and bold in a critical region where our policy needs rescuing,” said Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry.

*Jim Lobe’s blog on U.S. foreign policy can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.

14 Who Told Obama to Reconsider Escalating the War

March 25, 2009

Denial and Evasion on Afghanistan

By Norman Solomon | Counterpunch, March 24, 2009

Is your representative speaking out against escalation of the Afghanistan war?

Last week, some members of Congress sent President Obama a letter that urged him to “reconsider” his order deploying 17,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

Everyone in the House of Representatives had ample opportunity to sign onto the letter. Beginning in late February, it circulated on Capitol Hill for more than two weeks. The letter was the most organized congressional move so far to challenge escalation of the war in Afghanistan.

But the list of signers was awfully short.

* California: Bob Filner, Michael Honda
* Hawaii: Neil Abercrombie
* Kentucky: Ed Whitfield
* Maryland: Roscoe Bartlett
* Massachusetts: Jim McGovern
* Michigan: John Conyers
* North Carolina: Howard Coble, Walter Jones
* Ohio: Marcy Kaptur, Dennis Kucinich
* Tennessee: John Duncan
* Texas: Ron Paul
* Wisconsin: Steve Kagen

We desperately need a substantive national debate on U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the Obama administration says that the problems of the region cannot be solved by military means, the basic approach is reliance on heightened military means.

One of several journalists in Afghanistan on a tour “organized by the staff of commanding Gen. David D. McKiernan,” the Washington Post’s Jackson Diehl, wrote a March 23 op-ed in support of an invigorated “counterinsurgency strategy.” With journalistic resolve, he explained: “Everyone expects a surge of violence and American casualties this year; no one expects a decisive improvement in the situation for at least several years beyond that.”

The commanding general, Diehl added, does not anticipate that the Afghan army “can defend the country on its own” until 2016. In effect, the message is to stay the course for another seven years: “The thousands of American soldiers and civilians pouring into the country deserve that strategic patience; without it, the sacrifices we will soon hear of will be wasted.”

And so, with chillingly familiar echoes, goes the perverse logic of escalating the war in Afghanistan. “Strategic patience” — more and more war — will be necessary so that those who must die will not have died in vain.

In contrast, the letter from the 14 members of the House (eight Democrats, six Republicans) lays down a clear line of opposition to the rationales for stepping up the warfare.

“If the intent is to leave behind a stable Afghanistan capable of governing itself, this military escalation may well be counterproductive,” the letter says. And it warns that “any perceived military success in Afghanistan might create pressure to increase military activity in Pakistan. This could very well lead to dangerous destabilization in the region and would increase hostility toward the United States.”

More than 400 members of the House declined to sign the letter. In effect, they failed to join in a historic challenge to a prevailing assumption — that the U.S. government must use massive violence for many more years to try to work Washington’s will on Afghanistan.

An old red-white-and-blue bumper sticker says: “These colors don’t run.”

A newer one says: “These colors don’t run… the world.”

Now, it’s time for another twist: “These colors won’t run… Afghanistan.”

But denial and evasion are in the political air.

Norman Solomon is the author of Made Love, Got War.