Analysis by Praful Bidwai | Inter-Press Service News, Sep 8, 2008
NEW DELHI, – The special waiver granted to India by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) from its nuclear trade rules is being seen as a massive setback to the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
The NSG’s waiver will allow India to resume nuclear commerce with the rest of the world with very few restrictions although India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has refused to accede to any other agreement for preventing the spread of, reducing the numbers of, or abolishing nuclear weapons.
The 45-nation conglomerate, a private arrangement set up after India’s first nuclear weapons explosion in 1974, turned a full circle at its special meeting in Vienna, on the weekend, the second one in a fortnight, held at the behest of the United States.
The NSG was originally established “to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
But it has now done the very opposite by agreeing to the exceptional waiver for India as part of New Delhi’s controversial nuclear cooperation deal with the U.S. inked three years ago.
Washington hailed the waiver as “historic” and one that would boost nuclear non-proliferation, while New Delhi described the deal as an “important step” towards meeting the challenges of climate change and sustainable development.
Clearly though, the waiver only became possible because of the strong-arm methods used by the U.S. to bludgeon dissenting NSG members into agreeing to the exemption text it had drafted in consultation with India.
Contrary to the claim that the waiver, and more generally, the U.S.-India nuclear deal, will bring India into the global “non-proliferation mainstream” or promote nuclear restraint on India’s part, it will allow India to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and encourage a nuclear arms race in Asia, particularly in the volatile South Asian subcontinent, where Pakistan emerged as India’s nuclear rival 10 years ago.
The special waiver has been roundly criticised by nuclear disarmament and peace groups throughout the world, including in India.
The waiver, says the U.S.-India Deal Working Group of the disarmament network ‘ABOLITION 2000’, comprising more than 2,000 peace groups worldwide, “creates a dangerous distinction between ‘good’ proliferators and ‘bad’ proliferators and sends out misleading signals to the international community…”
“The exemption” it adds, “will not bring India further into conformity with the non-proliferation behaviour expected of the member-states of the NPT.”
Barring the exceptional situation in which India might conduct another nuclear test, the NSG imposes no significant conditions on nuclear trade with India. Even this condition is not stated up-front, and is mentioned in reference to a general statement by India’s Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee on Sep. 5, in which he reiterated India’s unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and its non-proliferation commitments.
But a voluntary moratorium can be lifted easily and unilaterally. In any case, it falls short of a legally binding commitment not to test.
India had insisted on a “clean and unconditional” waiver from the NSG, and has very nearly secured it, thanks to the indulgence of the U.S., which proposed the deal in the first place and lobbied hard and furiously for it.
With the waiver under its belt, India can proceed to import uranium fuel, of which it is running short, and a range of other nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for its civilian nuclear programme. But it can divert domestic uranium exclusively for weapons purposes.
“Under the U.S.-India nuclear deal, India signed an agreement to separate its military nuclear facilities from civilian installations and subject some of the latter to safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency,” says Achin Vanaik, head of the department of political science at Delhi University, and a national coordination committee member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (India).
According to Vanaik, India will only put 14 of its 22 operating or planned civilian nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards, which are meant to ensure that no nuclear material from them is diverted to military purposes. ”But it can use the remaining eight reactors to produce as much plutonium as it likes for its weapons programme.”
According to a report prepared by independent scientists and experts for the International Panel on Fissile Materials two years ago, these eight reactors alone can yield fuel for as many as 40 Nagasaki-type bombs every year.
In addition, India can produce more bomb fuel from its dedicated military nuclear facilities and fast-breeder reactors, which it can maintain and expand.
India accepts no limits or restrictions on the size of its nuclear arsenal and has an ambitious nuclear doctrine under which it continues to stockpile fissile material for weapons use.
The NSG has all but put its imprimatur on India’s nuclear activities which would allow it to expand its arsenal of mass-destruction weapons and thus set a negative example for the rest of the world, in particular, wannabe atomic states.
In the process, says Daryl F. Kimball of the Arms Control Association (U.S.), the NSG has undermined “efforts to contain Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes, and it will make it nearly impossible to win support for much-needed measures to strengthen the NPT” at its next review conference due in 2010.
The waiver may weaken and harm the NPT itself by aiding the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a country not recognised by it as a nuclear weapons-state, which it explicitly prohibits. Effectively, it expands the Nuclear Club to include a member which has refused to sign the treaty.
Within the NSG, there was a great deal of resistance to the waiver. An earlier meeting of the group, on Aug. 21-22, failed to produce a consensus — necessary for any decision to go through.
The resistance was led by six “like-minded” countries –Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland — which argued that India must accept three conditions in order to resume nuclear trade.
These included a periodic review of compliance with India’s non-proliferation pledges, exclusion from trade of sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, and cessation of nuclear commerce in case India tests.
In the event, India only accepted the first condition and doggedly refused to go beyond reiterating its unilateral moratorium on testing.
However, on the second day of the NSG meeting, Foreign Minister Mukherjee made a general statement saying that India is opposed to nuclear proliferation, does not subscribe to an arms race, and will behave responsibly as a nuclear weapons-state.
“The statement was inane and dishonest because India initiated and has sustained a nuclear arms race in South Asia,” says M.V. Ramana from the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in the Environment and Development, Banagalore. “It is really a sad commentary on the state of debate at the NSG if such statements actually create what was described by the U.S. delegate as a ‘positive momentum’…”
Eventually, the “positive result” in the form of the waiver was achieved after Mukherjee’s statement effectively split the “like-minded” group and led to the desertion of the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland on the evening of Sep. 5.
Behind the change was crude pressure, blackmail and induced fear of “isolation” on account of antagonising the “emerging power” that is India. The topmost leaders of the U.S., India and their allies worked the telephone lines to mount this pressure.
Kimball said that ‘’it appears as if George Bush and his team engaged in some nasty threats, misinformation about positions, and intimidation, to wear down the core six members … and their allies. You have to assume the conversations among foreign ministers, presidents, and prime ministers didn’t focus on the policy and non-proliferation issues, but raw politics”.
“Another factor,’’ Kimball added, ‘’was the role of Germany, ostensibly the NSG chair. At this meeting, the Germans apparently sat on their thumbs and let the Americans run the show and keep asking for more consultations despite the remaining differences. A more competent and less biased chair would have provided more balance and would have adjourned the meeting Friday night when it was clear there was still disagreement on some fundamental issues…”
China briefly emerged as a supporter of the Group of Six, when it asked that the waiver decision not be rushed. But, say Indian media reports, a critically timed telephone call from Bush to Chinese president Hu Jintao did the trick and China quickly fell in line.
“This was a triumph of crass power politics,” says Vanaik. “It is sad and profoundly disturbing that nobody resisted U.S. or Indian pressure and stood up for elementary principles in a group where even a single member could have blocked the waiver. India’s ‘victory’ is founded on crude muscle power and cynicism, and negates rational, democratic decision-making based on a commitment to making the world a safer place.”
(*IPS correspondent Praful Bidwai is a noted peace activist and co-founder of the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND), based in New Delhi.)
BOOKS-US: “A Policy of Deliberate Cruelty”
September 11, 2008By Mark Weisenmiller | Inter-Press Service News
TAMPA, Florida, Sep 10 (IPS) – Perhaps the most thorough and informative book about the George W. Bush administration’s approval of the use of torture and “extraordinary renditions” of alleged terrorists to third countries has continued to stay on bestseller lists.
First published in July, “The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals” (Doubleday) by Jane Mayer is still listed among the top 10 nonfiction best-selling books of 2008 by The New York Times.
In the book, Mayer, a reporter for The New Yorker magazine, shows in detail how high-level officials of the Bush administration, particularly in the office of Vice President Dick Cheney, took advantage of the fear and paranoia that gripped the country after the terrorist attacks of Sep. 11, 2001 to launch “an ideological trench war” and “a policy of deliberate cruelty that would’ve been unthinkable on Sept. 10”.
While Bush supported the overall strategy, he was almost a minor player, Mayer reports. “President Bush is not typically interested in fine details. He left those to others in the formation of the military commissions, and other areas,” she told IPS.
Arguably, the two administration officials whose post-9/11 policy decisions are most responsible for leaving the United States’ “reputation as a lead defender of democracy and human rights…in tatters”, in Mayer’s words, were Cheney and his Chief of Staff David Addington, whom Mayer notes the vice president came to rely on heavily for legal advice in prosecuting the “war on terror”.
In June this year, Addington was subpoenaed to testify before the House Judiciary Committee — along with former Justice Department attorney John Yoo — about detainee treatment, interrogation methods and the limits of executive authority.
Mayer, who was in the room when Addington testified, said “I…was struck by his utter contempt for both the Congressional panel that was quizzing him, and the gathering press.”
“He evidently thought that hauteur was the way to win the day, which was another example of his astoundingly poor political sense…I think at the moment, it’s a stretch to think that there is the necessary political will to prosecute top administration figures like Addington, who could argue that they were simply doing what they thought was necessary to protect the country.”
Regarding Cheney, she writes in “The Dark Side” that the vice president lived in such a state of anxiety after the 9/11 attacks that “…he was chauffeured in an armoured motorcade that varied its route to foil possible attackers. On the back seat behind Cheney rested a duffle bag stocked with a gas mask and a biochemical survival suit.”
Mayer asked repeatedly to interview Addington and Cheney and was refused. A one-paragraph statement by the CIA, regarding the conduct of its agents in the interrogation of alleged terrorists, is on the last page of “The Dark Side”.
However, she did manage to interview hundreds of sources in and around the Bush White House, as well as sources from the Red Cross, compiling a grim picture of interrogation and abuse of prisoners in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere.
The book describes the use of alleged forms of torture by members of a little-known U.S. military programme called SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape). It also explores the CIA’s hiring of psychologists of questionable abilities and morals, who proceeded to encourage the use of interrogation methods that were created decades ago, ironically enough by the former Soviet Union’s KGB secret police agency, and points out how essentially no piece of relevant information has ever resulted from such interrogations.
Mayer also looks at renditions, the transfer of suspected terrorists by U.S. authorities, mainly the CIA, to countries known to employ harsh interrogation techniques and torture. Asked if she believed that renditions were still being done by U.S. government agents, even though the practice has now been exposed by the world’s media, Mayer told IPS, “After the bad publicity surrounding them, there is likely a greater effort to ensure that they (U.S. government agencies) are not ‘rendering’ mistaken suspects, or sending them to be tortured, in contravention of the law, but the programme exists in a classified realm where this is hard to determine.”
Among the many disturbing incidents recounted in the book is the last night of Manadel al-Jamadi.
He was an Iraqi suspect who was detained outside of Baghdad at approximately four a.m. local time on Nov. 4, 2003. “An hour later, he was dead. An autopsy performed by military pathologists classified his death as a homicide,” writes Mayer.
She goes on to report that “Jamadi was driven first to an Army base for debriefing, where the (U.S. Navy special forces unit) SEALs punched, kicked, and struck him with their rifle muzzles for some 20 minutes.” Jamadi was later interrogated by CIA operatives at Abu Ghraib prison, where he was hung up by his wrists, and subsequently killed.
Eight members of the SEALs platoon received administrative punishment for abuse of al-Jamadi and other prisoners, but Mark Swanner, the CIA interrogator, has faced no charges.
“I hope readers (of “The Dark Side”) come away with a vivid sense of how far from American traditions the Bush administration strayed in choosing to set aside the rule of law, in it’s approach to the war on terror,” noted Mayer. “There have been other lapses in the past, but as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the late presidential historian told me ‘Nothing has hurt America more (in the world) ever.’.”
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Tags:Bush administration, Dick Cheney, Jane Mayer, John Yoo, Manadel al-Jamadi, renditions, SERE and torture, The Dark Side, United States, war on terror
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