Posts Tagged ‘Simon Jenkins’

The torture memos show how illegal wars turn even the nicest people bad

February 13, 2010

The deceit, the slaughter, the atrocity, the abuse of human rights. Today, Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil is everywhere

Simon Jenkins, The Guardian/UK, Feb 13, 2010

Something is wrong. A ­sensible, clean-living chap such as David ­Miliband wants nothing more ­sinister than to lead the Labour party, yet he finds himself consorting with spies, lawyers, rendition merchants and torturers. His only ­experience of coercion was waterboarding British school teachers with targets and red tape. Now he must defend the interrogators of Guantánamo and explain away the bloodstained cells of Pakistan and Morocco.

Whatever plaudits were due to ­Foreign Office lawyers during the ­Chilcot inquiry have been expunged by this week’s revelation of their antics in trying to conceal details of post-9/11 ­torture by British agents. The security services were clearly implicated in the brutal questioning of the Guantánamo inmate, Binyam Mohamed – treatment so bad as to render his trial unsafe and force his release.

Papers revealed by the high court depict a Foreign Office running about stamping on a stream of embarrassing disclosures, largely because Miliband was desperate not to seem a wimp in front of his hero, Hillary Clinton. We now know that both Miliband and the head of MI5, Jonathan Evans, told an untruth in asserting, as the latter said last October, that British security services do not practise torture, “nor do we collude in torture or solicit others to torture people on our behalf”.

While the definition of torture is moot, at least five relevant incidents in Guantánamo are admitted. On Wednesday, Miliband was forced to hire the maestro of Whitehall autocracy, Jonathan Sumption QC, to demand that the Master of the Rolls censor his damning judgment of Miliband to avoid giving further pain to ministers. We must assume that Miliband did not trust his own lawyers to do this dirty work. All this is because Britain believes that publishing details of what interrogators did to its residents would lead Washington to retaliate by not warning of an ­impending terror attack on London. The belief is absurd.

How did we reach this pass? The answer has taxed philosophers from Socrates to Hannah Arendt. Even the nicest people go to the bad when caught up in ill-conceived, illegal or unjust wars. Socrates wrestled with the duty of obedience to a stupid state. Arendt noted how easily officials drift down the path of horror when they lose sight of the point where morality calls on them to say no. They sink, she said, into “the banality of evil”.

The so-called war on terror saw a politically weak American president seek popularity in redefining a criminal act as a “war between states”. Tony Blair agreed. His assertion to the Chilcot inquiry that “9/11 changed everything” was self-serving. The attack was just the latest in a line of attempted terrorist atrocities by Islamist extremists, albeit one that succeeded horrifically.

To call such crimes acts of war gives them rhetorical force, but in no sense did al-Qaida or its imitators threaten the integrity or security of a western state. These countries are too strong for such threat to be meaningful. The only damage they can do beyond sudden carnage is self-inflicted, by governments that decide to react with exaggerated fear. Yet the pretence of “going to war” has unleashed two of the most destructive, costly and prolonged state-on-state aggressions in half a century.

What is extraordinary is the reluctance of British politics to bring a sense of proportion to the terrorist threat. Every agency of democracy, from parliament to the army, the police and the media, is directed at exaggerating the status and menace of al-Qaida – and thus at doing Osama bin Laden’s work for him.

Some politicians have clearly had doubts. At Chilcot, Jack Straw claimed to have proposed supporting, but not joining, America in Iraq. As it was, his overt backing for the war was, he boasts, critical since “if I had refused, the UK’s participation in the military action would not in practice have been possible”. Given his doubts and the weight of legal advice coming his way, it is hard to see him as anything but a man who lacked the courage of his convictions.

Other cabinet ministers are lining up to express their own doubts about Iraq, as they will one day do about Afghanistan. They say that war is “not my department”, that they “made Tony aware of my reservations”, that it was all America’s fault. Yet such was the deceit of these wars, such has been the ­slaughter, the atrocity against civilians, the torture of prisoners, the abuse of human rights – and so few the resignations – that Arendt’s banality of evil seems everywhere.

Tuesday’s Spectator debate on Afghanistan at the Royal Geographical Society, much attended by soldiers, had the jingoistic quality of Joan Littlewood’s Oh, What A Lovely War!. To the oft-repeated question, why are we there, speakers such as General Lord Guthrie and the historian Andrew Roberts pleaded the party line. It was “to make the streets of London safe”, to create a stable democratic state in Afghanistan that gave no house-room to al-Qaida, even if it took decades and even if the terrorists “moved elsewhere”.

Since this sounded like trying to empty the sea with a spoon, the case for war shifted over the course of the debate. It was to enable Britain “to be a real Nato force”, “to show itself to the world”, “to cut some ice”. The war became a manifestation of patriotism and national potency. Would it not be terrible to be another Germany, France, Sweden, Japan? War did not need just cause, or even efficacy, merely a noble epithet.

The case for being in Afghanistan has become an exercise in verbal sophistry. To Guthrie, we are killing Taliban “to stop them killing us”. To Roberts we are doing so to stop them setting off a dirty nuclear bomb, which would “spread cancer over a 30-mile radius”, a terrorist-appeasing fantasy debunked in John Mueller’s recent Atomic Obsession.

The truth is that mission creep has made this war largely ideological – witness constant ministerial references to Kabul ­corruption, to opium, warlordism and the treatment of women. The streets of London are not being saved in the plains of Helmand, any more than they would be if the fight went to the mountains of Waziristan or the hills of Yemen. To the war party, ­Islam is the problem. It is the regime that must be changed.

Yet an enemy that poses no concerted threat to western territory or western interests has been allowed to damage the west’s liberal tradition. Bush and Blair were brazenly unconcerned with international law. We now have it confirmed that they do not care for the Geneva conventions. Such hard-won restraints on the practice of war, such as not bombing civilian targets, not assassinating leaders, respecting cultural sites, treating prisoners humanely, and sustaining the rule of law back home, have been casually set aside.

Like all bad wars, those in Iraq and Afghanistan taint any who touch them. In the next few days, thousands of ­British troops will, yet again, have to fight to clear some Taliban for a while from some patch of Helmand. Ask the purpose of this fight and the answer makes no sense. The means of war may have advanced since the days of Athenian democracy, but the ends not at all.

Obama must call off this folly before Afghanistan becomes his Vietnam

June 28, 2009

Senseless slaughter and anti-western hysteria are all America and Britain’s billions have paid for in a counterproductive war

Simon Jenkins | guardian.co.uk, Thursday 28 June 2009 22.00 BST

If good intentions ever paved a road to hell, they are doing so in Afghanistan. History rarely declares when folly turns to ­disaster, but it does so now. Barack Obama and his amanuensis, Gordon Brown, are uncannily repeating the route taken by American leaders in Vietnam from 1963 to 1975. Galbraith once said that the best thing about the Great Depression was that it warned against another. Does the same apply to Vietnam?

Vietnam began with Kennedy’s noble 1963 intervention, to keep the communist menace at bay and thus make the world safe for democracy. That is what George Bush and Tony Blair said of ­terrorism and Afghanistan. Vietnam escalated as the Diem regime in Saigon failed to contain Vietcong aggression and was deposed with American ­collusion. By 1965, despite Congress scepticism, American advisers, then planes, then ground forces were deployed. Allies were begged to join but few agreed – and not Britain.

The presence of Americans on Asian soil turned a local insurgency into a regional crusade. Foreign aid rallied to the Vietcong cause to resist what was seen as a neo-imperialist invasion. The hard-pressed Americans resorted to ever more extensive bombing, deep inside neighbouring countries, despite ­evidence that it was ineffective and politically counterproductive.

No amount of superior firepower could quell a peasant army that came and went by night and could terrorise or merge into the local population. Tales of American atrocities rolled in each month. The army counted success not in territory held but in enemy dead. A desperate attempt to “train and equip” a new Vietnamese army made it as corrupt as it was unreliable. Billions of dollars were wasted. A treaty with the Vietcong in 1973 did little to hide the humiliation of eventual defeat.

Every one of these steps is being re-enacted in Afghanistan. Every sane observer, even serving generals and diplomats, admit that “we are not winning” and show no sign of doing so. The head of the British army, Sir Richard Dannatt, remarked recently on the “mistakes” of Iraq as metaphor for Afghanistan. He has been supported by warnings from his officers on the ground.

Last year’s denial of reinforcements to Helmand is an open secret. Ever since the then defence secretary, John Reid, issued his 2006 “London diktats”, described in a recent British Army Review as “casual, naive and a comprehensive failure”, intelligence warnings of Taliban strength have been ignored. The army proceeded with a policy of disrupting the opium trade, neglecting hearts and minds and using US air power against “blind” targets. All have proved potent weapons in the Taliban armoury.

Generals are entitled to plead for more resources and yet claim that ­victory is just round the corner, even when they know it is not. They must lead men into battle. A heavier guilt lies with liberal apologists for this war on both sides of the Atlantic who continue to invent excuses for its failure and offer glib preconditions for victory.

A classic is a long editorial in ­Monday’s New York Times, congratulating Barack Obama on “sending more troops to the fight” but claiming that there were still not enough. In addition there were too many corrupt politicians, too many drugs, too many weapons in the wrong hands, too small a local army, too few police and not enough “trainers”. The place was damnably unlike Connecticut.

Strategy, declared the sages of Manhattan, should be “to confront the Taliban head on”, as if this had not been tried before. Afghanistan needed “a functioning army and national police that can hold back the insurgents”. The way to achieve victory was for the Pentagon, already spending a stupefying $60bn in Afghanistan, to spend a further $20bn – increasing the size of the Afghan army from 90,000 to 250,000. This was because ordinary Afghans “must begin to trust their own government”.

These lines might have been written in 1972 by General Westmoreland in his Saigon bunker. The New York Times has clearly never seen the Afghan army, or police, in action. Eight years of training costing $15bn have been near useless, when men simply decline to fight except to defend their homes. Any Afghan pundit will attest that training a Pashtun to fight a Pashtun is a waste of money, while training a Tajik to the same end is a waste of time. Since the Pentagon ­originally armed and trained the Taliban to fight the Soviets, this must be the first war where it has trained both sides.

Neither the Pentagon nor the British Ministry of Defence will win Afghanistan through firepower. The strategy of “hearts and minds plus” cannot be realistic, turning Afghanistan into a vast and indefinite barracks with hundreds of thousands of western soldiers sitting atop a colonial Babel of administrators and professionals. It will never be secure. It offers Afghanistan a promise only of relentless war, one that Afghans outside Kabul know that warlords, drug cartels and Taliban sympathisers are winning.

The 2001 policy of invading, ­capturing Osama bin Laden and ­ridding the region of terrorist bases has been tested to destruction and failed. ­Strategy is reduced to the senseless slaughter of hundreds of young western soldiers and thousands of Afghans. Troops are being sent out because Labour ministers lack the guts to admit that Blair’s bid to quell the Islamist menace by force of arms was crazy. They parrot the line that they are making “the streets of London safe”, but they know they are doing the opposite.

Vietnam destroyed two presidents, Johnson and Nixon, and ­destroyed the global confidence of a ­generation of young Americans. ­Afghanistan – ­obscenely dubbed the “good war” – could do the same. There will soon be 68,000 American troops in that country, making a mockery of Donald Rumsfeld’s 2001 tactic of hit and run, which at least had the virtue of coherence.

This is set fair to be a war of awful proportions, cockpit for the feared clash of civilisations. Each new foreign ­battalion taps more cash for the Taliban from the Gulf. Each new massacre from the air recruits more youths from the madrasas. The sheer counterproductivity of the war has been devastatingly analysed by David Kilcullen, adviser to Obama’s key general – David Petraeus – no less.

Obama is trapped by past policy ­mistakes as were Kennedy and Johnson, cheered by an offstage chorus crying, “if only” and “not enough” and “just one more surge”. He and Petraeus have to find a means and a language to ­disengage from Afghanistan, to allow the anti-western hysteria of the Muslim world – which the west has done so much to foster – now to cool. It is hard to imagine a greater tragedy than for the most exciting American president in a generation to be led by a senseless intervention into a repeat of America’s greatest postwar debacle.

As for British politicians, they seek a proxy for their negligence in Afghanistan by staging a show trial of their ­negligence in Iraq. Why do they fiddle while Helmand burns? Might they at least ask how they can spend £40bn a year on defence yet watch a mere 8,000 troops on their one active front having to be rescued by Americans?