Peace and Justice Post

The Globe and Mail

Richard Norton-Taylor, Guardian News Service, Jan. 12, 2010

Tony Blair privately assured President George Bush in letters written a year before the invasion of Iraq that Britain would “be there” in any US-led attack on the country, it was revealed at the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war in London Tuesday.

The disclosure came during sometimes sharp exchanges with Alastair Campbell, Mr. Blair’s communications chief and close adviser, who described Gordon Brown, the then UK finance minister, as “one of the key ministers” the former Prime Minister spoke to about Iraq.

In almost five hours of questioning, Mr. Campbell:

– Defended “every single word” in the Blair government’s now largely discredited dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons programme.

– Said Britain should be “proud” of its role in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

– Said Mr. Blair tried to get the conflict with Iraq resolved “without a shot being fired.”

Mr. Blair wrote “quite a lot of notes” to Mr. Bush in 2002 and their substance was not shared with the cabinet, Mr. Campbell made clear. Asked if the then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, knew their contents, Mr. Campbell replied: “I very much doubt if drafts went round the system … They were very frank.” However, Mr. Campbell said they were discussed with Sir David Manning, Mr. Blair’s foreign policy adviser.

He said the tenor of the letters was: “We share the analysis, we share the concern, we are going to be with you in making sure that Saddam Hussein is faced up to his obligations and that Iraq is disarmed.” Mr. Campbell added: “If that cannot be done diplomatically and it is to be done militarily, Britain will be there. That would be the tenor of the communication to the president.”

The letters Mr. Blair wrote to Mr. Bush have been passed to the Chilcot inquiry. It has not given any indication about whether it will publish them.

Mr. Campbell was responding to persistent questioning from Sir Roderic Lyne, a member of the inquiry panel and a former ambassador. Mr. Lyne referred Mr. Campbell to a leaked document in which Mr. Manning, on a trip to Washington in March 2002, a year before the invasion, told Mr. Blair he had underlined Britain’s position to Condoleezza Rice, Mr. Bush’s national security adviser.

“I said you [Blair] would not budge in your support for regime change, but you had to manage a press, a parliament, and a public opinion which is very different than anything in the States,” Mr. Manning wrote.

Responding to Mr. Lyne’s question, Mr. Campbell said: “The prime minister’s overall approach was saying ‘there’s going to be disarmament. We’re going to do our level best to get that through the diplomatic route, without a single shot being fired but, if push comes to shove and the diplomatic route fails, Britain would see it as its responsibility and its duty to take part in military action’.”

Blair was determined to disarm Saddam, Campbell said. Mr. Blair’s message to the US in April 2002 was he would try to do it through UN resolutions. However, “if the only way is regime change through military action then the British government will support the American government”, Mr. Campbell said, describing Mr. Blair’s view.

The inquiry has also heard from senior British diplomats that regime change was being discussed by Mr. Blair in the US in 2002 even though, according to leaked documents, Lord Goldsmith, the then attorney general, warned Mr. Blair that military action aimed at regime change, as opposed to disarmament, would be unlawful.

Mr. Campbell stoutly defended the September 2002 Iraqi weapons dossier which stated Saddam Hussein was continuing to build up a nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programme – claims that were shown to be without foundation after the invasion. He insisted Sir John Scarlett, then chairman of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee, was adamant throughout that he was “100 per cent in charge” of the process of drawing up the dossier.

“At no time did I ask him to ‘beef up’, to override, any of the judgments that he had,” Mr. Campbell told the inquiry. “John Scarlett said to me ‘This is a document the prime minister is going to present to parliament, there are massive global expectations around it, and I need a bit of presentational support,’ and that is what I gave him.”

At no time did Mr. Scarlett or intelligence officers question the contents of the dossier, said Mr. Campbell.

Mr. Campbell on occasions sharply criticized the British media and played down any influence he had over journalists. Asked about the notorious claim in the weapons dossier that Iraq could deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes he said it had only been given “iconic” status by the press.

Asked if it could have been made clear that the claim only ever applied to battlefield weapons rather than longer range missiles, Mr. Campbell replied: “Obviously, but it’s not that big a point.”

He disclosed the UK’s then international development secretary Clare Short, who subsequently resigned over the war, had been excluded from discussions on the aftermath of the conflict because of fears of leaks.

“I think in an ideal world the secretary of state for international development would, should and could have been involved in all those discussions,” he said. “It was no secret that she was very difficult to handle at times. I think sometimes the military found her approach to them difficult to deal with.”