Posts Tagged ‘the Pentagon’

Guantanamo detainee ‘was tortured’, Pentagon official admits

January 15, 2009
January 14, 2009

A Guantanamo prisoner often described as the ’20 hijacker’ in the September 11 attacks was tortured by his American interrogators, a senior official at the Pentagon has admitted.

Mohammed Al-Qahtani’s interrogations at Guantanamo in 2002 and 2003, which included sleep deprivation and exposure to cold had been described by officials as abusive.

But the Pentagon has always refused to acknowledge that the treatment of the Saudi national amounted to torture.

However Susan J Crawford, the senior official at the Pentagon responsible for prosecuting detainees has told The Washington Post that she decided last May not to refer his case for trial because she had concluded that he had been tortured.

“His treatment met the legal definition of torture. And that’s why I did not refer the case” Ms. Crawford, a retired military judge, told Bob Woodward of the Washington Post.

She said she came to the conclusion after studying the combination of techniques used on him which she said had a ‘medical impact.’

“The techniques they used were all authorized, but the manner in which they applied them was overly aggressive and too persistent,” she said.

“You think of torture, you think of some horrendous physical act done to an individual. This was not any one particular act; this was just a combination of things that had a medical impact on him, that hurt his health. It was abusive and uncalled for. And coercive. Clearly coercive. It was that medical impact that pushed me over the edge” to call it torture, she added.

Military documents show that Mr. al-Qahtani’s repeated interrogations included prolonged isolation, sleep deprivation, forced nudity and exposure to cold. He was forced to dance with a male interrogator and to act like a dog, obeying such commands as “stay,” “come” and “bark.”

A Pentagon inquiry in 2005 found that the methods were “degrading and abusive.” Mr. Qahtani’s lawyers at the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York said they left him a broken man who has attempted suicide.

He had been denied entry to the US in August 2001, a month before the attacks on the Twin Towers. He was later captured in Afghanistan and taken to Guantanamo in 2002 where he was accused of plotting the attacks, alongside five other Guantanamo detainees.

Military prosecutors sought the death penalty but in May, Ms Crawford decided not to refer his case for trial. At the time she refused to offer an explanation.

Today she defended his continued detention, describing him as a “muscle hijacker”.

“There’s no doubt in my mind he would’ve been on one of those planes had he gained access to the country,” Ms. Crawford said in the interview. “What do you do with him now if you don’t charge him and try him? I would be hesitant to say, ‘Let him go,’ ” she added

Ms Crawford,who served as general counsel for the Army during the Reagan administration, and was the Pentagon’s inspector general when Dick Cheney was secretary of defense, is the first senior Bush administration official responsible for reviewing practices at Guantanamo to publicly state that a detainee was tortured.

In a statement on Tuesday, the Pentagon said that more than a dozen investigations into Mr al-Qahtani’s treatment had concluded that the interrogations were lawful.

“However, subsequent to those reviews,” the statement said, “the department adopted new and more restrictive policies and improved oversight procedures for interrogation and detention operations.

“Some of the aggressive questioning techniques used on al-Qahtani, although permissible at the time, are no longer allowed in the updated Army field manual,” the statement said.

In November, military prosecutors indicated they would file new charges with Ms Crawfor,.based on subsequent interrogations that did not employ harsh techniques.

But Ms Crawford, who dismissed war crimes charges against him in May 2008, told MR Woodward she would not allow the prosecution to go forward.

The war they all agree on

September 19, 2008

America’s two ruling parties came together in August to plan the escalation of the U.S. war on Afghanistan.

IN EARLY September, the Pentagon closed its investigation into allegations that U.S. bombs killed 92 Afghan civilians, including as many as 60 children, as they slept peacefully in the village of Nawabad on the night of August 21.

Columnist: Sharon Smith

Sharon Smith Sharon Smith is the author of Subterranean Fire: A History of Working-Class Radicalism in the United States, a historical account of the American working-class movement, and Women and Socialism, a collection of essays on women’s oppression and the struggle against it. She is also on the board of Haymarket Books.

Despite protests from the UN, human rights organizations and the villagers themselves, Pentagon officials insisted for weeks that only seven civilians had been killed, along with 35 Taliban fighters, during a legitimate military operation aimed at capturing Taliban commander Mullah Sadiq.

Indeed, they claimed that the attack, which included bombardment with a C130 Specter gunship, was a necessary response to heavy fire emanating from a meeting of Taliban leaders in the village.

In its defense, the Pentagon cited evidence from an embedded Fox News correspondent who had substantiated its claims. Unfortunately, that correspondent turned out to be former Marine Lt. Oliver North, who has been known to bend the truth in the past.

North’s military career was cut short after his role was revealed in the Iran-contra scandal in the 1980s. At the time, North admitted to having illegally channeled guns to Iran while funneling the profits to the CIA-backed contra mercenary force fighting to overthrow Nicaragua’s democratically elected Sandinista government–and then lying to Congress about it. In recent years, North has nevertheless cultivated a lucrative broadcasting career at Fox.

U.S. soldiers take up positions in the town of Gangikhel in southeastern Afghanistan  (Sgt. Sean Terry | U.S. Army)U.S. soldiers take up positions in the town of Gangikhel in southeastern Afghanistan (Sgt. Sean Terry | U.S. Army)

Although North assured Fox viewers, “Coalition forces…have not been able to find any evidence that non-combatants were killed in this engagement,” video footage taken on the scene by a local doctor showed scores of dead bodies and destroyed homes, documenting a civilian death toll at Nawabad that is the largest since the U.S. began bombing Afghanistan nearly seven years ago.

Thus, the U.S. military was forced to reopen its own investigation on September 8, only days after it had exonerated itself. A red-faced official told reporters that “emerging evidence” had convinced the Pentagon to investigate the matter further.

On that same day, Human Rights Watch issued a report that U.S. and NATO forces dropped 362 tons of bombs over Afghanistan during the first seven months of this year; bombings during June and July alone equaled the total during all of 2006.

The rising civilian death toll in Afghanistan rattled even the normally placid New York Times, which argued, “America is fast losing the battle for hearts and minds, and unless the Pentagon comes up with a better strategy, the United States and its allies may well lose the war.”

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AS NEWS of the Nawabad massacre unfolded, another atrocity was also gaining media attention, further exposing the gangster state installed and maintained by U.S. forces to run Afghanistan since 2001.

President Hamid Karzai, the U.S.’s handpicked puppet, reportedly pardoned two men convicted of brutally raping a woman in the northern province of Samangan in September 2005.

At the time, Mawlawi Islam, the commander of a local militia, was running for a seat in Afghanistan’s first parliamentary elections. “The commander and three of his fighters came and took my wife out of our home and took her to their house about 200 meters away and, in front of these witnesses, raped her,” the woman’s husband told the Independent.

The couple has a doctor’s report that the rapists cut her private parts with a bayonet during the rape, and then forced her to stagger home without clothes from the waist down.

Mawlawi won a seat in parliament in September 2005, as the U.S. media celebrated the elections as proof that democracy was flourishing in Afghanistan thanks to U.S. occupation. But Mawlawi was assassinated, mafia-style in January of this year.

His past had caught up with him. Mawlawi had first fought as a mujahideen commander in the 1980s, but switched sides to become a Taliban governor in the 1990s. He switched sides yet again when the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and re-joined the former mujahideen, which had morphed into the Northern Alliance–the group of warlords installed by the U.S. to run Afghanistan as a collection of private gangster fiefdoms.

Karzai issued a press statement expressing his “deep regret” in response to Mawlawi’s death in January. Bypassing the rape charge, he expressed nothing but praise: “Mawlawi Islam Muhammadi was a prominent jihadi figure who has made great sacrifices during the years of jihad against the Soviet invasion.”

Mawlawi’s three subordinates were finally convicted for the rape this year, and one died in prison. But although they were sentenced to 11 years, Karzai reportedly issued a pardon for the other two in May, claiming the men “had been forced to confess their crimes.”

The drug-running warlords who have controlled Afghanistan since 2001 have no interest in either democracy or women’s rights. Indeed, it is not uncommon for poor poppy farmers who cannot repay loans to local warlords to offer up their daughters for marriage instead.

Gang rapes and violence against women are on the rise, according to human rights organizations. As a member of parliament, Mir Ahmad Joyenda, told the Independent, “The commanders, the war criminals, still have armed groups. They’re in the government. Karzai, the Americans, the British sit down with them. They have impunity. They’ve become very courageous and can do whatever crimes they like.” In this situation, Afghan warlords again produce 90 percent of the world’s opium, without legal repercussion.

Women’s prisons, in contrast, are teeming once again. As Sonali Kolhatkar, the author of Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords and the Propaganda of Silence, argued on Democracy Now! “Women are being imprisoned in greater numbers than ever before, for the crime of escaping from home or having, quote-unquote, ‘sexual relations’–‘illegal sexual relations.’ Most of these women are simply victims of rape.”

Continued . . .

Record number of US contractors in Iraq

August 18, 2008
Some 190,000 private personnel were working in the Iraq theater as of early this year, a new report says.

Reporter head shot

Reporter Peter Grier gives a breakdown of contract work being done for the US military in Iraq.

The American military has depended on private contractors since sutlers sold paper, bacon, sugar, and other small luxuries to Continental Army troops during the Revolutionary War.

But the scale of the use of contractors in Iraq is unprecedented in US history, according to a new congressional report that may be the most thorough official account yet of the practice.

As of early 2008, at least 190,000 private personnel were working on US-funded projects in the Iraq theater, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) survey found. That means that for each uniformed member of the US military in the region, there was also a contract employee – a ratio of 1 to 1.

“It is … exceptional the degree to which the military’s currently relying on such contractors,” said CBO director Peter Orszag at an Aug. 12 press conference.

In the Korean conflict, the ratio was 2.5 uniformed personnel for each contractor. In Vietnam, the comparable figure was 5 to 1.

The Balkans conflict of the 1990s provided a glimpse of the future, as it also featured a 1-to-1 military-to-civilian worker ratio.

But in the Balkans, the overall deployment numbers “were of a much smaller scale than what we are seeing in Iraq,” Mr. Orszag said.

A number of factors are behind the Pentagon’s growing dependence on contractors, says the CBO report. Reductions in the size of the post-cold war military mean that private firms now provide more and more of the logistical support needed to keep the armed services running, such as food supply and housekeeping services on bases. In general, all US agencies in recent decades have outsourced more and more functions judged not inherently governmental.

In Iraq in particular, the ranks of contractors have been bolstered by the US decision to try to rebuild the country while hostilities were still under way.

The CBO estimates the total cost of these military contractor operations from 2003 through 2008 to be $100 billion. That’s about 20 percent of all US funding for operations in Iraq.

Most of this money went for logistics support – food-service operation, fuel distribution, equipment maintenance, and procurement and property management.

Roughly $12 billion of the $100 billion total paid for private security contractors – the gun-toting guards of Blackwater and other paramilitary personnel providers.

The CBO looked at the cost of hiring private guards versus the cost of providing similar security with US military units. Among the factors analysts took into consideration was that the Pentagon must pay and outfit multiple brigades to keep one in Iraq, due to deployment rotations.

The result was a tie, according to the CBO.

“The cost of having an Army contingent provide the same services as Blackwater appears to be roughly the same as the cost of the contract itself,” Orszag said.

The same holds true for more mundane logistical operations, says the CBO. Hiring a private oil-truck driver for Iraq costs about as much as recruiting, training, and providing a uniformed equivalent.

However, critics of military outsourcing say the real problem is flexibility and command-and-control over private workers.

For instance, private guards have been loose cannons in Iraq, critics say. A federal grand jury is investigating whether Blackwater guards acted illegally when they opened fire in a busy Baghdad intersection last September. Among the most contentious issues in the status-of-forces agreement now being negotiated by the US and Iraqi governments is whether private guards will be subject to arrest and trial by Iraqi authorities.

“One of the key questions surrounding the government’s escalating use of military contractors is actually not whether they save the government client money or not…. Rather, the crucial question that should be asked at the onset of any potential outsourcing is simple: Should the task be done by a private company in the first place?” wrote Peter Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution, in an analysis earlier this year.

Is Perpetual War Our Future?

August 17, 2008

Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Bush Era

By Andrew Bacevich | ZNet, August 16, 2008

To appreciate the full extent of the military crisis into which the United States has been plunged requires understanding what the Iraq War and, to a lesser extent, the Afghan War have to teach. These two conflicts, along with the attacks of September 11, 2001, will form the centerpiece of George W. Bush’s legacy. Their lessons ought to constitute the basis of a new, more realistic military policy.

In some respects, the effort to divine those lessons is well under way, spurred by critics of President Bush’s policies on the left and the right as well as by reform-minded members of the officer corps. Broadly speaking, this effort has thus far yielded three distinct conclusions. Whether taken singly or together, they invert the post-Cold War military illusions that provided the foundation for the president’s Global War on Terror. In exchange for these received illusions, they propound new ones, which are equally misguided. Thus far, that is, the lessons drawn from America’s post-9/11 military experience are the wrong ones.

According to the first lesson, the armed services — and above all the Army — need to recognize that the challenges posed by Iraq and Afghanistan define not only the military’s present but also its future, the “next war,” as enthusiasts like to say. Rooting out insurgents, nation-building, training and advising “host nation” forces, population security and control, winning hearts and minds — these promise to be ongoing priorities, preoccupying U.S. troops for decades to come, all across the Islamic world.

Rather than brief interventions ending in decisive victory, sustained presence will be the norm. Large-scale conventional conflict like 1991’s Operation Desert Storm becomes the least likely contingency. The future will be one of small wars, expected to be frequent, protracted, perhaps perpetual.

Although advanced technology will retain an important place in such conflicts, it will not be decisive. Wherever possible, the warrior will rely on “nonkinetic” methods, functioning as diplomat, mediator, and relief worker. No doubt American soldiers will engage in combat, but, drawing on the latest findings of social science, they will also demonstrate cultural sensitivity, not to speak of mastering local languages and customs. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it in October 2007, “Reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure and promoting good governance” had now become soldiers’ business. “All these so-called nontraditional capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy — where they must stay.”

This prospect implies a rigorous integration of military action with political purpose. Hard power and soft power will merge. The soldier on the ground will serve as both cop and social worker. This prospect also implies shedding the sort of utopian expectations that produced so much confident talk of “transformation,” “shock-and-awe,” and “networkcentric warfare” — all of which had tended to segregate war and politics into separate compartments.

Local conditions will dictate technique, dooming the Pentagon’s effort to devise a single preconceived, technologically determined template applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict. When it comes to low-intensity wars, the armed services will embrace a style owing less to the traditions of the Civil War, World War II, or even Gulf War I than to the nearly forgotten American experiences in the Philippines after 1898 and in Central America during the 1920s. Instead of looking for inspiration at the campaigns of U. S. Grant, George Patton, or H. Norman Schwarzkopf, officers will study postwar British and French involvement in places like Palestine and Malaya, Indochina and Algeria.

Continued . . .