Posts Tagged ‘Iraq’

The US Empire will Survive Bush

October 30, 2008

Two Parties, One Imperial Mission

By ARNO MAYER| Counterpunch, Oct 29, 2009

The United States may emerge from the Iraq fiasco almost unscathed. Though momentarily disconcerted, the American empire will continue on its way, under bipartisan direction and mega-corporate pressure, and with evangelical blessings.It is a defining characteristic of mature imperial states that they can afford costly blunders, paid for not by the elites but the lower orders. Predictions of the American empire’s imminent decline are exaggerated: without a real military rival, it will continue for some time as the world’s sole hyperpower.

But though they endure, overextended empires suffer injuries to their power and prestige. In such moments they tend to lash out, to avoid being taken for paper tigers. Given Washington’s predicament in Iraq, will the US escalate its intervention in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia or Venezuela? The US has the strongest army the world has ever known. Preponderant on sea, in the air and in space (including cyberspace), the US has an awesome capacity to project its power over enormous distances with speed, a self-appointed sheriff rushing to master or exploit real and putative crises anywhere on earth.

In the words of the former secretary of  defense, Donald Rumsfeld: “No corner of the world is remote enough, no mountain high enough, no cave or bunker deep enough, no SUV fast enough to protect our enemies from our reach.”       The US spends more than 20% of its annual budget on  defense, nearly half of the spending of the rest of the world put together. It’s good for the big US corporate arms manufacturers and their export sales. The Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, purchase billions of dollars of state-of-the-art ordnance.

Instead of establishing classic territorial colonies, the US secures its hegemony through some 700 military, naval and air bases in over 100 countries, the latest being in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Rumania, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ethiopia and Kenya. At least 16 intelligence agencies with stations the world over provide the ears and eyes of this borderless empire.

The US has 12 aircraft carriers. All but three are nuclear-powered, designed to carry 80 planes and helicopters, and marines, sailors and pilots. A task force centerd on a supercarrier includes cruisers, destroyers and submarines, many of them atomic-powered and equipped with offensive and defensive guided missiles. Pre-positioned in global bases and constantly patrolling vital sea lanes, the US navy provides the new model empire’s spinal cord and arteries. Ships are displacing planes as chief strategic and tactical suppliers of troops and equipment. The navy is now in the ascendant over the army and the air force in the Pentagon and Washington.

The US military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean from 2006 to 2008 shows how the US can flex its muscles half-way around the globe (and deliver humanitarian relief at gunpoint for political advantage). At least two carrier strike groups with landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and thousands of sailors and marines, along with Special Operations teams, operate out of Bahrain, Qatar and Djibouti. They serve notice that, in the words of the current  defense secretary, Robert Gates, speaking in Kabul in January 2007, the US will continue to have “a strong presence in the Gulf for a long time into the future”.

Continued . . .

Iraq: Did the Surge Work?

October 24, 2008

by George Hunsinger

Violence, Alexander Solzenitsyn once observed, finds refuge in falsehood, even as falsehood is supported by violence. “Anyone who has once acclaimed violence as his method must inexorably choose falsehood as his principle.” (Nobel Prize acceptance speech, 1972) A practical rule can be deduced. Where there is violence, look for falsehood; where there is falsehood, look for violence. If Solzenitsyn is correct, they go together.

According to conventional wisdom, it seems that the “surge” in Iraq was a huge success. For example, a recent CNS News story was headlined: “With Success of Surge, NY Times’ Iraq War Coverage Drops to All-Time Low” (October 21, 2008). The Times’ coverage has dropped 60 per cent since 2004, and this is not terribly different from other news outlets. The media has lost interest in Iraq. Whether the surge really “worked,” however, is another story.

In September 2007, Juan Cole, the respected Middle East expert, wrote an article called “Big Lies Surround the Iraq ‘Surge.'” At that time he stated: “US troop deaths in Iraq have not fallen and . . . violence in Iraq has not fallen because of the Surge. Violence is way up this year.” But, one might reply, that was then and this is now. How do matters stand more than a year after this gloomy verdict? A widespread consensus exists today throughout the political campaigns and the mainstream media that the great success of the Surge is beyond doubt.

The so-called Surge — a euphemism for escalation — was designed to increase security in Iraq. U.S. presence in the country was to be increased by 30,000 personnel along with a three-fold contribution in Iraqi forces. Additional troops were to be provided by coalition partners. Baghdad was selected as the center of the campaign. If security could be increased for the country’s largest city, the rest would surely follow. A Shi’ite and Sunni “fault line” ran throughout the city.

In January 2007, a year after being launched, the Surge was widely acclaimed as a triumph. Contrary to naysayers like Cole, violence across the country was said to be down by 60 percent. Al Qaeda in Iraq, expelled from Baghdad and Anbar Province, was said to be on the run, and the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior reported that it was 75 percent destroyed. Not only was the violence in Iraq reduced, but Al Qaeda was being decimated.

Again, however, Cole, who relies on independent sources in the original languages, argued otherwise. What actually seems to have happened, he wrote in the summer of 2008, was that, first, the Sunni Arabs in Baghdad were disarmed by the escalation troops. Then, “once these Sunnis were left helpless, the Shiite militias came in at night and ethnically cleansed them.”

Mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad ended up with almost no Sunnis. In 2007 Baghdad went from being predominantly Sunni to being overwhelmingly Shiite. According to Brian Katulis of the Center for American Progress, Baghdad, once having a 65 percent Sunni majority, “is now 75 percent Shia.”

“My thesis,” wrote Cole, “would be that the U.S. inadvertently allowed the chasing of hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs out of Baghdad (and many of them had to go all the way to Syria for refuge). Rates of violence declined once the ethnic cleansing was far advanced, just because there were fewer mixed neighborhoods.”

Cole’s thesis has received important confirmation. According to Bob Woodward, in his new book The War Within (Simon & Schuster, 2008), the biggest factor behind the reduced violence in Iraq was “very possibly” not the Surge, but a resort to Death Squads. A “Top Secret” memo viewed by Woodward indicates that the Sunnis were systematically targeted and assassinated. What took place was reminiscent of the infamous Phoenix Program instituted by the U.S. in Vietnam. It was a strategy of summary executions.

Yet another confirmation appeared in a recent study conducted by scientists at the University of California. Based on an examination of satellite photos across Baghdad, the study observed that Sunni neighborhoods, which showed a dramatic decrease of nighttime light in Sunni neighborhoods, had been abandoned by their inhabitants. The surge, the study concluded, “has had no observable effect.” The study attributed the tremendous decline in Baghdad’s Sunni population to relocations and ethnic cleansing.

Tom Hayden raises some disturbing questions. “Why were the targets killed instead of being detained? How many targeted individuals were killed or made to disappear? . . . How are the operations consistent with US constitutional law and international human rights standards?” Why has thee been no congressional investigation?

According to UN reports, the number of Iraqi refugees has spiked during the Surge. Between 2.5 and 4 million are now estimated to exist outside their country, while another 2.5 are internal refugees. At least 2 million Sunni refugees cannot return to their homes without fear of being slaughtered.

People’s lives remain shattered. One in four has had a family member who was murdered. “The humanitarian situation in most of the country remains among the most critical in the world,” according to the Iraqi Red Cross/Red Crescent. Iraq’s health care system is “now in worse shape than ever.”

Unemployment remains high, sanitation and electrical facilities remain degraded, families use up to a third of their monthly income to buy drinking water. Tens of thousands are being held in detention camps. According to the UN, “the detention of children in adult detention centers violates U.S. obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as accepted international human rights norms.” (AP, May 19, 2008)

Resorting to Death Squads, while ignoring the humanitarian crisis and touting the Surge, seems to offer yet another instance of Solzenitsyn’s bleak prognosis that violence seeks refuge in falsehood.

George Hunsinger teaches at Princeton Theological Seminary

Washington warns Iraq to accept security deal

October 23, 2008

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Bush administration on Wednesday warned of “real consequences” for Iraq if it rejects a newly negotiated security pact. Without a deal, the United States could be forced to end its military operations.

The White House said Iraqi security forces are incapable of keeping the peace without U.S. troops, raising the specter of reversals in recent security and political gains if the proposed security deal is not approved by the time the current legal basis for U.S. military operations expires Dec. 31.

“There will be no legal basis for us to continue operating there without that,” White House press secretary Dana Perino said. “And the Iraqis know that. And so, we’re confident that they’ll be able to recognize this. And if they don’t, there will be real consequences, if Americans aren’t able to operate there.”

At the Pentagon, press secretary Geoff Morrell said the U.S. fallback position is to extend the U.N. Security Council mandate authorizing U.S.-led coalition operations in Iraq, but he emphasized that the Bush administration’s preference is to complete a bilateral U.S.-Iraqi agreement.

“Our focus is entirely on trying to get this deal done,” Morrell said.

Morrell said Defense Secretary Robert Gates has not had direct contacts with Iraqi officials since Baghdad announced earlier this week that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki determined that unspecified changes to the draft accord are required. The spokesman said it was not clear what changes the Iraqis are demanding.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the draft agreement “both protects our troops and the Iraqi sovereignty” and would stand as it was negotiated.

“It is a good agreement,” Rice told reporters traveling with her Wednesday to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, where she was to meet her Mexican counterpart, Patricia Espinosa.

Rice would not say whether she opposes the Iraqi Cabinet petition to reopen negotiations.

“I understand the Iraqis themselves recognize they are not ready to operate without the coalition forces yet,” Rice said.

At the State Department, spokesman Robert Wood said time was running short.

“It’s time for the Iraqis to step up to the plate and take a decision,” Wood said. He insisted that the administration had yet to hear anything official from the Iraqi government on its position or its suggestions for possible amendments.

The U.S. has 155,000 troops in Iraq. In addition to conducting combat operations against a weakened insurgency and hunting down al-Qaida fighters, the U.S. military is training Iraqi security forces, assisting in the resettlement of displaced persons, coordinating efforts to restore and improve basic services like water and sewage, and providing personal security for senior Iraqi government officials.

Iraqi government on Wednesday decried what it called the “not welcomed” statements from Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who cautioned the Iraqis of unwelcome consequences in the event that the security pact is not signed by the end of the year.

Mullen, who was traveling in Europe, told reporters on Tuesday that time was running out for the Iraqis to sign the deal and that he was concerned the Iraqis may not fully appreciate the seriousness of the situation.

“These statements are not welcomed in Iraq,” Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said in a statement. “All Iraqis realize the volume of their responsibilities and they appreciate the importance of signing the pact or not in the way they deem it proper.”

Al-Dabbagh added: “A compulsory method must not be imposed on their choice and it is improper to address Iraqis in such manner.”

Morrell said the Iraqis should not take Mullen’s comments as an attempt to force anything on them.

“That couldn’t be further from the truth,” Morrell said. “We are not trying to pressure the Iraqis or force the Iraqis into signing anything they don’t wish to sign.”

In subsequent remarks Wednesday, Mullen said he believes the Iraqis are not ready to provide their own defense, according to a Pentagon account of comments to reporters traveling with him.

Mullen also made clear in those remarks that if there is no U.S.-Iraqi deal and the U.N. mandate runs out on Dec. 31 without being extended by the Security Council, then all U.S. military operations would have to cease. Mullen and other senior U.S. military officials have said repeatedly that the security situation in Iraq is too fragile to justify a full U.S. withdrawal anytime soon.

The proposed security pact calls for all U.S. combat forces to be removed from Iraqi cities by June 2009 and for all forces to leave the country by the end of 2011, unless both sides agree to an extension.

In a satellite video-teleconference from Baghdad, an Army commander told reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday that his understanding is that by June 2009 U.S. troops would not be based inside cities but would be allowed to operate as trainers and advisers attached to Iraqi military units.

“We will have embedded teams,” Col. William Hickman, commander of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, said. “And those teams will remain with Iraqi army and the Iraqi police in execution of our mission. So that is how we’re seeing our situation here — to continue to focus on the training of the Iraqi security forces so that they are prepared as we go into spring and summer of next year.”

Hickman’s brigade operates in western Baghdad.

Morrell announced that on Thursday the Iraqis would regain security responsibilities for Babil province, making it the 12th of Iraq’s 18 provinces to be restored to Iraqi control.

Associated Press writers Lolita C. Baldor, Matthew Lee, Terence Hunt and Nestor Ikeda contributed to this story.

Tens of Thousands of Iraqis Mass for Anti-SOFA Protest

October 18, 2008

Antiwar, October 18, 2008

At least 50,000 Iraqis joined a protest in the streets of Baghdad today, organized by followers of Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, chanting anti-US and anti-occupation slogans and waving banners opposing the controversial Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which would keep US troops in Iraq through 2011.

Though Sadr was not personally present at the rally, he did address the crowd in a message directed at Iraqi lawmakers, read by Sheik Abdul-Hadi al-Mohammadawi. In the statement he urged Iraq’s parliament to “champion the will of the people over that of the occupier” and oppose the pact. He also cautioned that passing the deal “will stigmatize Iraq and its government for years to come.”

Sadr is just one of many influential religious leaders, both Sunni and Shi’ite, speaking out against the SOFA. The high attendance for the rally underscores a growing popular hostility for the deal, which faces a long battle for approval in the Iraqi government.

Though it is unclear at this point whether the terms of the deal are finalized, officials reported this was the case earlier in the week though White House Press Secretary Dana Perino denied it yesterday, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari says it would be “difficult to reopen the text” and that it was time for parliament to either ratify or reject the deal. He added that “the next few days are very crucial for Iraqi leaders to decide.”

Popular and religious opposition to the deal as well as a splintering coalition government will make it extremely difficult for Iraq’s parliament to pass the deal. And even though a simple majority is all that is required for passage, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reportedly intends to submit it for consideration only if he is confident it will receive a two-thirds majority, fearing criticism if the vote is close.

Related Stories

U.S., Iraqi Officials Question Terms of Draft Security Deal

October 18, 2008

At Issue: Legal Authority Over Troops

By Mary Beth Sheridan and Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writers, Saturday, October 18, 2008

BAGHDAD, Oct. 17 — A number of senior Iraqi and U.S. politicians expressed strong reservations Friday about the terms of a draft agreement that gives Iraq the “primary right” — subject to U.S. acquiescence — to try American soldiers accused of serious crimes committed during off-duty hours outside U.S. military bases here.

Some political leaders in Baghdad, who got their first look at the controversial agreement to extend the U.S. military presence in Iraq beyond 2008, said it did not go far enough in guaranteeing Iraqi sovereignty. The bilateral accord was presented Friday to the Political Council for National Security, an advisory body including political, legislative and judicial leaders, whose support is necessary before it can be submitted to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki‘s cabinet and then to parliament for final approval. After an initial review, the council said it would continue discussions next week.

In Washington, congressional Democrats questioned ceding any authority over U.S. troops to Iraq. “I am very concerned about reports that U.S. service personnel may not have full immunity under Iraqi law,” said Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), the House Armed Services Committee chairman. The Bush administration allowed a small group of senior congressional aides to read the document at a White House briefing this morning but did not allow copies to be made.

A provision in the draft would give the United States “primary” jurisdiction over military personnel and Defense Department employees who are on bases or engaged in authorized military operations.

Iraq, it says, would have the “primary right to exercise judicial jurisdiction” over “premeditated and gross felonies . . . committed outside the agreed facilities and areas and when not on a mission.” Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said Friday that any disagreement would be resolved by a joint committee. “If the crime is very grave or serious, the U.S. may waive its jurisdiction,” he said.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters at a Pentagon briefing that “there is not a reason to be concerned.” He said top U.S. military officials “are all satisfied that our men and women in uniform serving in Iraq are well protected.” U.S. officials have emphasized that off-duty American troops in Iraq rarely, if ever, venture outside their bases, and said that they consider language in the document vague enough to ensure absolute U.S. control in all circumstances.

Administration officials also said they are confident that withdrawal dates in the document — June 30, 2009, for U.S. forces in Iraqi cities and Dec. 31, 2011, from all of Iraq — contain sufficient caveats to address any future downturn in the security situation. Before the final deadline, the draft says, “on the basis of Iraq’s assessment of conditions on the ground,” the Iraqi government could ask for U.S. troops to remain for “training purposes” or to “support Iraqi security forces.”

The accord also would prohibit U.S. forces from detaining any Iraqi citizen without an Iraqi warrant, and says any detainee would have to be handed over to government custody within 24 hours. All Iraqis in U.S. custody as of Jan. 1 — when the agreement would go into effect upon expiration of the current U.N. mandate authorizing foreign troops here — would have to be turned over to the Iraqi government. Home and property searches also would require an Iraqi warrant, except during certain combat situations.

U.S. and Iraqi officials confirmed the wording of the document, portions of which were widely circulated in both capitals Friday.

The sensitivity of the draft agreement, which has been under negotiation since March, was illustrated when Maliki lashed out at the top American commander here for saying that U.S. intelligence indicated Iran was trying to bribe Iraqi lawmakers to reject the pact.

“The American commander has risked his position when he spoke in this tone and has complicated relations in a deplorable way,” Maliki told a group of Kuwaiti journalists in an interview broadcast by Iraqi state television Friday. Maliki expressed astonishment at the remarks from U.S. Gen. Ray Odierno, whom he described as a “kind and good man.” Iraqi members of parliament, he said, had not accepted any bribes.

Maliki was reacting to a Monday article in The Washington Post in which Odierno said Iran was conducting a “full-court press” with its Iraqi contacts to sabotage the pact, including “coming in to pay off people to vote against it.” A U.S. military spokesman later said there was no confirmation that bribes had been accepted by lawmakers.

A number of Iraq’s leading political leaders spent years in exile in Iran during the presidency of Saddam Hussein and maintain warm relations with the Tehran government. Several expressed sharp offense at Odierno’s comments.

Jalal al-Deen al-Saghir, a top lawmaker from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Maliki’s main political partner, said in an interview that he saw “serious problems” in the proposed accord, “especially after Odierno’s statements.”

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Friday that there was a misunderstanding about Odierno’s comments. “I don’t think General Odierno was implying that there are crooked Iraqi politicians, but rather that there are Iranian agents who, in their attempt to derail the [agreement], are trying to bribe Iraqi politicians,” he said.

In Najaf, the religious capital of Iraq’s Shiite majority, a leading cleric blasted the idea of giving U.S. forces any immunity from Iraqi law. “We consider this a basic point because it represents sovereignty,” Sadir Addin al-Qobanchi said in a sermon at the city’s grand mosque. “If someone commits a hostile act against your house and family, and you say it is fine and don’t hold him responsible, it means that you don’t have dignity or sovereignty.”

U.S. military and political officials have expressed concern that the agreement may not make it through Iraq’s slow-moving political process by year’s end. An extension of the U.N. mandate, the most likely option if a final agreement is not reached, poses political and legal complications for both sides.

Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish lawmaker, said the agreement could gain the approval of the political council and the cabinet. But in parliament, supporters of the agreement “will face opposition,” he said. The accord, which must win a majority in the 275-seat parliament, is strongly supported by the Kurdish bloc, the second-biggest with 54 seats. Various Sunni and independent parties representing scores of seats have also indicated their approval.

But Othman said the backing of some politicians was not solid.

“They tell the Americans, ‘We are okay, we’ll sign it.’ Then they tell their people in parliament not to vote for it,” he said.

The U.S. Congress does not have similar veto power over the agreement, which requires only a presidential signature. But senior Democrats, and a number of Republicans, have questioned its terms. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) said in a statement Friday that complete American jurisdiction over U.S. service members was “critical” and that they could not be “subject to criminal prosecution in an Iraqi judicial system that does not meet due process standards.” Levin said he would “reserve judgment” on the draft until he was given an opportunity for a “complete review” of its terms.

DeYoung reported from Washington. Staff writer Ann Scott Tyson in Washington and special correspondent Qais Mizher in Baghdad contributed to this report.

Pentagon Challenge: Ask Iraqis How Many Have Died

October 15, 2008

by Robert Naiman | CommonDreams.org, Oct 14, 2008

The U.S. military is planning a large polling operation in Iraq over the next three years to help “build robust and positive relations with the people of Iraq and to assist the Iraqi people in forming a new government,” Walter Pincus reports in the Washington Post.

This provides an excellent opportunity to revisit an important question:

How many Iraqis have died since the U.S. invasion?

The $15 million-a-year initiative will supplement the military’s $100 million-a-year strategic communications operation, which aims to produce content for Iraqi media that will “engage and inspire” the population, Pincus notes.

The size and scope of the program “will provide an extraordinary amount of data,” said a former government official. Another former official noted that $15 million is far more than the State Department allocates annually for its polling activities worldwide.

Pincus notes that the larger Pentagon project of which this polling is a part has been controversial in Congress. In particular, Senator Webb has asked for suspension of the new Army contracts to produce print, radio and television news stories as well as entertainment programs in Iraq.

While I support Senator Webb’s very reasonable proposal, I would also like to suggest a different approach to the proposed polling project.

Use it.

In particular, I think Congress should require the Pentagon to ask Iraqis the following questions:

“How many members of your household have died since March, 2003? How many members of your household have died since March, 2003 due to violence?”

Inclusion of these questions would allow the U.S. government to estimate how many Iraqis have been killed since the U.S. invasion.

Not only should Congress require the Pentagon to ask these questions, but Congress should require the Pentagon to use the data so gathered to create estimates of Iraqi deaths since 2003, and of how many of those deaths were due to violence. And Congress should require that those numbers be reported to Congress.

When the “Lancet study” (that is, the Johns Hopkins study) estimated two years ago that 600,000 Iraqis had died, President Bush dismissed the study as “not credible,” without offering his own estimate, or explaining why that estimate was “not credible.”

Much ink has been spilled since then in the dispute over estimates of Iraqi casualties (relatively little, however, of that ink has been spilled in our corporate media in the United States.)

Just Foreign Policy publishes an extrapolation of the Lancet study, using the trend which can be inferred from the Iraq Body Count tally. If the Lancet study estimate was roughly correct, and if Iraq Body Count gives a roughly accurate trend, that would suggest more than a million deaths due to violence in Iraq since March 2003, over and above what would have occurred had there been no U.S. invasion.

Now, the Bush Administration has the opportunity to set the record straight. The Pentagon is, apparently, going to be polling Iraqis anyway, so there would be no additional cost. And if the Pentagon is going to be polling Iraqis on a regular basis, then the question could be repeated, so as to arrive at a more accurate estimate.

I double dare the Pentagon to ask Iraqis this question. If the Pentagon is brave, it will agree.

Of course, it could well be that, facing the prospect of being required to come up with its own estimate of Iraqi deaths, the Pentagon would lose interest in polling Iraqis. So be it. But if the Pentagon is going to poll Iraqis, then this simple question should be among the questions that they ask.

Just Foreign Policy Iraqi Death Estimator

Robert Naiman is Senior Policy Analyst at Just Foreign Policy

Iraqi PM: UK forces ‘not needed’

October 13, 2008
Al Jazeera, Oct 13, 2008

Al-Maliki criticised British troops for redeploying to the airport on the edge of Basra [AFP]

Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister, has said that British troops are no longer needed to maintain security in the south of the country.

“We thank them for the role they have played, but I think that their stay is not necessary for maintaining security and control,” he told The Times, a London-based newspaper, in an interview published on Monday.

British forces were based in the southern city of Basra after the US-led invasion in 2003, but they handed over responsibility for the region’s security to Iraqi forces last December.

About 4,100 British troops are still based at the airport outside Basra.

Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, was already expected to significantly cut the number of troops in the contingent over the next year.

“There might be a need for their experience in training and some technological issues, but as a fighting force, I don’t think that is necessary,” al-Maliki said.

British soldiers helped to train the Iraqi army and navy, while a special forces unit based in Baghdad has been used to attack al-Qaeda fighters and other groups.

Basra violence

The Iraqi prime minister had some harsh criticism for the British military’s decision earlier this year to move from their base at a former presidential palace in Basra to the airport on the outskirts.

“They stayed away from the confrontation, which gave the gangs and militias the chance to control the city,” he told The Times.

“The situation deteriorated so badly that corrupted youths were carrying swords and cutting the throats of women and children. The citizens of Basra called out for our help … and we moved to regain the city.”

Thousands of Iraqi security forces were sent into the southern city at the end of March to tackle armed Shia groups and criminals, with the fighting ending only after Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shia leader, agreed to a ceasefire.

However, al-Maliki said that despite the disagreements, Iraq was open to links with British businesses and other ties.

“Our relationship now is good and we are working to improve it further in other fields as we take over responsibility for security,” he said.

Iraq must rid itself of US troops, Iran says

October 10, 2008

Iran is trying to derail an agreement that would allow US and British troops to stay in Iraq after their mandate expires at the end of this year.

In a move that has raised concern among senior Iraqi and US officials, Tehran is using its influence over its smaller neighbour to scupper a Status of Forces Agreement, which must be reached by January 1.

After the deadline US and British troops would have no legal basis to remain and, in theory, would have to leave.

This week President Ahmadinejad told a senior official from Baghdad that Iraq had a duty to rid itself of US forces. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Majlis (parliament) gave warning of “unpleasant impacts” if Iraq went ahead with the deal.

Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad, accused the US of trying to impose the agreement on Iraq and said that Washington was treating the country like a football.

Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, assured the Iranian Ambassador that the draft agreement included a clause that prevented foreign forces from using Iraq as a springboard for attacks against its neighbours.

He also reminded Iran that the decision was one for Iraq, its parliament and its people. “We expect that our decisions will be respected by all our neighbours,” Mr Zebari said.

Iran has been accused of arming, training and funding militant Shia Muslim groups in Iraq that were responsible for attacks on US and British forces.

Under the current United Nations Security Council resolution the 150,000 US and 4,000 British troops in Iraq have a mandate to remain until December 31.

After that a bilateral agreement must be in place. A draft document has been drawn up but there is still controversy over the wording about immunity for foreign troops serving in Iraq. The document also sets out a timeline in which all US forces could be removed by 2011.

Iraqi leaders are expected to meet next week to decide whether to push through the agreement, which must be ratified by the 275-member Iraqi parliament.

An agreement seemed likely earlier this year but Iraqi and US officials have now given warning that it is complicated by the Iraqi elections in January. While most Iraqi politicians privately accept the need for the Americans to remain, few are prepared to say so publicly, particularly before an election.

Secrets of Iraq’s death chamber

October 7, 2008

Prisoners are being summarily executed in the government’s high-security detention centre in Baghdad. Robert Fisk reports

The Independent, Oct 7, 2008

The headquarters, pictured in 2003, where the killings are carried out

GETTY

The headquarters, pictured in 2003, where the killings are carried out

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Like all wars, the dark, untold stories of the Iraqi conflict drain from its shattered landscape like the filthy waters of the Tigris. And still the revelations come.

The Independent has learnt that secret executions are being carried out in the prisons run by Nouri al-Maliki’s “democratic” government.

The hangings are carried out regularly – from a wooden gallows in a small, cramped cell – in Saddam Hussein’s old intelligence headquarters at Kazimiyah. There is no public record of these killings in what is now called Baghdad’s “high-security detention facility” but most of the victims – there have been hundreds since America introduced “democracy” to Iraq – are said to be insurgents, given the same summary justice they mete out to their own captives.

The secrets of Iraq’s death chambers lie mostly hidden from foreign eyes but a few brave Western souls have come forward to tell of this prison horror. The accounts provide only a glimpse into the Iraqi story, at times tantalisingly cut short, at others gloomily predictable. Those who tell it are as depressed as they are filled with hopelessness.

“Most of the executions are of supposed insurgents of one kind or another,” a Westerner who has seen the execution chamber at Kazimiyah told me. “But hanging isn’t easy.” As always, the devil is in the detail.

“There’s a cell with a bar below the ceiling with a rope over it and a bench on which the victim stands with his hands tied,” a former British official, told me last week. “I’ve been in the cell, though it was always empty. But not long before I visited, they’d taken this guy there to hang him. They made him stand on the bench, put the rope round his neck and pushed him off. But he jumped on to the floor. He could stand up. So they shortened the length of the rope and got him back on the bench and pushed him off again. It didn’t work.”

There’s nothing new in savage executions in the Middle East – in the Lebanese city of Sidon 10 years ago, a policeman had to hang on to the legs of a condemned man to throttle him after he failed to die on the noose – but in Baghdad, cruel death seems a speciality.

“They started digging into the floor beneath the bench so that the guy would drop far enough to snap his neck,” the official said. “They dug up the tiles and the cement underneath. But that didn’t work. He could still stand up when they pushed him off the bench. So they just took him to a corner of the cell and shot him in the head.”

The condemned prisoners in Kazimiyah, a Shia district of Baghdad, are said to include rapists and murderers as well as insurgents. One prisoner, a Chechen, managed to escape from the jail with another man after a gun was smuggled to them. They shot two guards dead. The authorities had to call in the Americans to help them recapture the two. The Americans killed one and shot the Chechen in the leg. He refused medical assistance so his wound went gangrenous. In the end, the Iraqis had to operate and took all the bones out of his leg. By the time he met one Western visitor to the prison, “he was walking around on crutches with his boneless right leg slung over his shoulder”.

In many cases, it seems, the Iraqis neither keep nor release any record of the true names of their captives or of the hanged prisoners. For years the Americans – in charge of the notorious Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad – did not know the identity of their prisoners. Here, for example, is new testimony given to The Independent by a former Western official to the Anglo-US Iraq Survey Group, which searched for the infamous but mythical weapons of mass destruction: “We would go to the interrogation rooms at Abu Ghraib and ask for a particular prisoner. After about 40 minutes, the Americans brought in this hooded guy, shuffling along, shackled hands and feet.

Continued . . .

US Raid Kills 11 Members of Mosul Family

October 6, 2008

Antiwar,  October 5, 2008

US forces conducted a dawn raid on a house in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in which they believed a “suspected insurgent” was hiding. When the clash was over, 11 members of a single Iraqi family were dead.

The US wasn’t specific about the nature of the deaths, citing only someone with a suicide vest. However, an Iraqi security source said the US troops killed all 11. An Iraqi medic said the dead were five men, three women, and three children. The US report said five “terrorists,” three women, and three children. Surviving the raid were a three year old child and a three month old infant. The child is in Iraqi army custody, while Iraqi police are tending to the infant.

The Multi-National Forces press release claimed the troops found a “hidden weapons cache” of small arms. Rear Admiral Patrick Driscoli cited the incident as “just another tragic example of how al-Qaeda in Iraq hides behind innocent Iraqis.”

Given the raid only sought a “suspected insurgent” it is unclear how the admiral was able to connect the incident to al-Qaeda. Likewise, it is unclear how the coalition forces determined that every single adult man killed in the building was a “terrorist” when the raid was completed.