Archive for the ‘Commentary’ Category

Kinzer: Surge Diplomacy, Not Troops, in Afghanistan

December 10, 2008

by Robert Naiman

USA Today reports that Gen. McKiernan – top U.S. commander in Afghanistan – “has asked the Pentagon for more than 20,000 soldiers, Marines and airmen” to augment U.S. forces. McKiernan says U.S. troop levels of 55,000 to 60,000 in Afghanistan will be needed for “at least three or four more years.” He added: “If we put these additional forces in here, it’s going to be for the next few years. It’s not a temporary increase of combat strength.”

We should have a vigorous national debate before embarking on this course. Contrary to what one might think from a quick scan of the newspapers, there are knowledgeable voices questioning whether increasing the deployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan is in our interest, or is in the interest of the Afghan people.

Bestselling author and former longtime New York Times foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer argues the opposite in this five minute video:

Kinzer argues that sending more U.S. troops is likely to be counterproductive. It’s likely to produce more anger in Afghanistan, and more anger is likely to produce more recruits for the Taliban. A better alternative would surge diplomacy instead, reaching out to people who are now supporting the Taliban.

Al Qaeda and the Taliban are very different forces, argues Kinzer. The Taliban has deep roots in Afghan society. Many of the warlords allied with the Taliban are not fanatic ideologues.

Afghanistan is a place of fluid loyalties, Kinzer notes. A warlord allied with the Taliban may not be anti-American, or if he is today, he need not be tomorrow. We should take advantage of these fluid loyalties, and try to follow the diplomatic solution that Afghans and Afghan leaders are advocating.

Almost all the money in Afghanistan fueling the insurgency comes from the Afghan poppy crop, the source of most of the world’s heroin, Kinzer notes. We’re trying to crush that poppy-growing culture in an impossible way, Kinzer says. Burning and spraying poppy fields will never achieve that goal. All that does is impoverish Afghans and make them more angry at us.

The entire Afghan poppy crop is worth four billion dollars a year. We’re now spending $4 billion a month on our war in Afghanistan. Let’s take one of those months, and buy the entire poppy crop, suggests Kinzer. That way we’re not impoverishing Afghans, we’re putting money in their pockets instead of shooting them and burning down their houses. We’d use some of that to make morphine for medical use and we could burn the rest.

If we continue to act as if there’s a military solution in Afghanistan, we’re just going to get further dragged down into quagmire. There is a way out, Kinzer says. We can follow a much more sophisticated diplomatic and political strategy in a way that will reduce the ability of the Taliban to attract young recruits. What we’re doing now is the opposite, fueling the insurgency. Sending fewer troops to Afghanistan, not more, is needed to stabilize Afghanistan.

If you agree with Stephen Kinzer, why not send a note to that effect to President-elect Obama?

Robert Naiman is Senior Policy Analyst and National Coordinator at Just Foreign Policy.

Leading Chinese dissident, Liu Xiaobo, arrested over freedom charter

December 10, 2008

Mulla Omar asks foreign forces to chalk out exit plan

December 9, 2008

The News International, December 08, 2008

PESHAWAR: Linking the peace to troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban supreme leader Mulla Muhammad Omar Sunday urged foreign forces to prepare an exit strategy as early as possible.

“Today the world’s economy is facing growing risk from meltdown owing to the belligerent and expansionist policies of US. This has left its negative impact on the globe and it is the collective duty of all to work for a lasting peace in the world,” the Afghan Islamic Press quoted Mulla Omar as saying in his message on the occasion of Eidul Azha.

“You should understand that no puppet regime will ever stand up to the current resistance movement. Nor you will justify the occupation of the Islamic countries under the so-called slogan of rehabilitation anymore,” he added.

The Taliban leader said deployment of more troops would lead to battles everywhere. “The current armed clashes will spiral and your current casualties of hundreds will jack up to thousands,” he warned.

Mulla Omar said the US had imposed the war on the Afghan nation and the followers of the path of Islamic resistance would never abandon their legitimate struggle.

He said the invading forces wrongly contemplate that they would be able to pit the Afghans against the mujahideen under the so-called label of tribal militias. “No Afghan will play into the hands of the aliens and fight against his own brothers for worldly pleasure.”

Mulla Omar also felicitated the Muslims on the auspicious occasion of Eidul Azha.

“I would like to extend my warmest felicitation on Eidul Azha to all the Muslims of the world; to the oppressed, suffering but committed and brave people of Afghanistan, especially my heartfelt felicitation goes to all the Mujahideen on this auspicious day. May Allah Almighty bless the Islamic Ummah, and particularly the families of the prisoners and martyrs to pass this auspicious day with patience, happiness and pride. May Allah, the Almighty bestow on our wealthy men and women the willpower to share their amenities with all the miserable people, particularly with the families, widows and orphans of the heroic martyrs, the oppressed prisoners and the Mujahideen.”

Shambles in Afghanistan: Why Are They Dying?

December 7, 2008

Brian Cloughley | The Smirking Chimp,  December 6, 2008

There can be few things more shameful or degrading for a head of state to have to admit than “I wish I could intercept the [US] planes that are going to bomb Afghan villages, but that’s not in my hands.” But Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai was forced to say this last week. In 2008, so far, at least 190 Afghan civilians have been killed by air strikes; about the same number as died in the atrocious slaughter in Mumbai. But there haven’t been any protests about the killing of civilians in Afghanistan, except by Afghans, of course. But who listens to Afghans?

No, it’s not in Karzai’s hands to rule his country, as he was elected to do. It is in the hands — or fists — of the occupying powers, who, through a pathetic combination of arrogance, ignorance and incompetence, are, in Karzai’s words, “still…not able to defeat the Taliban”.

The Taliban (or whatever one might call them — crazy criminal barbarians, many of them) thrive and kill because there was no viable political plan to administer Afghanistan after the invasion, and the country was thus doomed to chaos. First to arrive at the end of 2001 were American B-52 bombers, laying waste the land until their Strangelove-like controllers ran out of targets.

Then the brutal northern warlords surfaced, bought with millions of US dollars, and wreaked unspeakable atrocities upon their tribal and personal enemies whom they dubbed ‘Taliban’ while laughing at their paymasters’ ingenuousness at believing their vicious deceptions.

Last came a combination of international agencies, bless their well-meaning hearts, and American troops who have caused so much disruption, alienation and hatred. In the middle are the Brits, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Australians and a few other nations whose soldiers are being killed.

For what, exactly?

As I write this, there is news that two British Marines and an Australian officer have been killed in Afghanistan. They were in 42 Royal Marine Commando and 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment, with both of which I was an artillery forward observer in Borneo when we were defending Malaysia against the Indonesian army in the mid-1960s. As anyone who has worn uniform knows, every soldier has lasting loyalty to his regiment and to other units with which he has had served. And I grieve for those who died almost as much as do their immediate comrades.

But I ask: Why did they die? For what reason do their comrades and families mourn their loss? For what cause did they give up their lives?

Did they die for democracy? Hardly. Because Afghanistan will never — ever — be a democracy in Western terms. This is an unattainable and therefore stupid objective.

Did they die for honesty in government? Hardly. Because the British and Australian governments joined the illegal invasion of Iraq, and lied at the time and forever after about the reasons they did so. (The real reason they helped invade Iraq was that they didn’t want to offend Bush and his cabal of demented warniks.)

It goes deeper than this in military terms. The British defence minister, a clever political animal called David Miliband (I met him once, when he was a junior education minister, and never have I witnessed such an unintentionally side-splitting parody of the main character in the BBC’s wonderful “Yes, Minister”), last week announced that “If there are requests [by the US for more British troops in Afghanistan], we’ll look at them hard… We have never been in blanket refusal.”

No, you poor fellow, you’ve been wrapped in a blanket of ignorance. Because numbers of troops in a campaign do not — must not — depend on political machinations. What happens (or should happen) is this:

A government decides that there should be military action of some sort. The defence minister then calls for his military chief and tells him the precise objective of the proposed campaign. The chief goes away and has his staff do the calculations. He goes back to the minister and says we need X thousand troops to do this, and we must have such-and-such equipment.

And if the politicians won’t give him that number of troops and the equipment he asks for, he resigns. Well, no, he doesn’t, of course, because he’s looking forward to retirement directorships and so forth. What he does is defer to the ignorant politicians, whereupon he commits his soldiers to a war for which they are ill equipped and appallingly under-strength.

Soldiers die in wars. That’s taken for granted. We all took our chances. But soldiers are dying in Afghanistan because politicians were silly enough to get their countries involved without proper planning, and because of the spinelessness of their military leaders. This is no way to fight a war. Not only is it being fought with too few troops, but every national contingent has different rules of engagement. Some can’t fight at night; some aren’t permitted to fight at all; some are reluctant to cooperate with other foreign forces. The two US contingents operate entirely separately, and US Special Forces are tasked from their HQ in the States. There is no unified joint and combined command that has a single clear military mission. It’s a martial shambles.

As I’ve written before: If a young officer at any staff college in the world was presented with the Afghanistan problem and came up with a military solution such as in now in place, he would be sent packing.

Either foreign forces in Afghanistan are given proper military direction and provided with the troop numbers and equipment they need, or the whole dismal campaign should be abandoned. It is extremely stupid — indeed it is monstrously wicked — to place soldiers in danger without the basic necessities to carry out their duties. There should be very many guilty consciences among western politicians and senior officers. But if they had consciences, they wouldn’t have got into this mess in the first place.

Brian Cloughley’s book about the Pakistan army, War, Coups and Terror, has just been published by Pen & Sword Books (UK). His email is beecluff@gmail.com.

Afghanistan: Another Untold Story

December 7, 2008

By Michael Parenti | Information Clearing House, Dec 5, 2008

Barack Obama is on record as advocating a military escalation in Afghanistan. Before sinking any deeper into that quagmire, we might do well to learn something about recent Afghan history and the role played by the United States.

Less than a month after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, US leaders began an all-out aerial assault upon Afghanistan, the country purportedly harboring Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist organization. More than twenty years earlier, in 1980, the United States intervened to stop a Soviet “invasion” of that country. Even some leading progressive writers, who normally take a more critical view of US policy abroad, treated the US intervention against the Soviet-supported government as “a good thing.” The actual story is not such a good thing.

Some Real History

Since feudal times the landholding system in Afghanistan had remained unchanged, with more than 75 percent of the land owned by big landlords who comprised only 3 percent of the rural population. In the mid-1960s, democratic revolutionary elements coalesced to form the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). In 1973, the king was deposed, but the government that replaced him proved to be autocratic, corrupt, and unpopular. It in turn was forced out in 1978 after a massive demonstration in front of the presidential palace, and after the army intervened on the side of the demonstrators.

The military officers who took charge invited the PDP to form a new government under the leadership of Noor Mohammed Taraki, a poet and novelist. This is how a Marxist-led coalition of national democratic forces came into office. “It was a totally indigenous happening. Not even the CIA blamed the USSR for it,” writes John Ryan, a retired professor at the University of Winnipeg, who was conducting an agricultural research project in Afghanistan at about that time.
The Taraki government proceeded to legalize labor unions, and set up a minimum wage, a progressive income tax, a literacy campaign, and programs that gave ordinary people greater access to health care, housing, and public sanitation. Fledgling peasant cooperatives were started and price reductions on some key foods were imposed.

The government also continued a campaign begun by the king to emancipate women from their age-old tribal bondage. It provided public education for girls and for the children of various tribes.

A report in the San Francisco Chronicle (17 November 2001) noted that under the Taraki regime Kabul had been “a cosmopolitan city. Artists and hippies flocked to the capital. Women studied agriculture, engineering and business at the city’s university. Afghan women held government jobs—-in the 1980s, there were seven female members of parliament. Women drove cars, traveled and went on dates. Fifty percent of university students were women.”

The Taraki government moved to eradicate the cultivation of opium poppy. Until then Afghanistan had been producing more than 70 percent of the opium needed for the world’s heroin supply. The government also abolished all debts owed by farmers, and began developing a major land reform program. Ryan believes that it was a “genuinely popular government and people looked forward to the future with great hope.”

But serious opposition arose from several quarters. The feudal landlords opposed the land reform program that infringed on their holdings. And tribesmen and fundamentalist mullahs vehemently opposed the government’s dedication to gender equality and the education of women and children.

Because of its egalitarian and collectivist economic policies the Taraki government also incurred the opposition of the US national security state. Almost immediately after the PDP coalition came to power, the CIA, assisted by Saudi and Pakistani military, launched a large scale intervention into Afghanistan on the side of the ousted feudal lords, reactionary tribal chieftains, mullahs, and opium traffickers.

A top official within the Taraki government was Hafizulla Amin, believed by many to have been recruited by the CIA during the several years he spent in the United States as a student. In September 1979, Amin seized state power in an armed coup. He executed Taraki, halted the reforms, and murdered, jailed, or exiled thousands of Taraki supporters as he moved toward establishing a fundamentalist Islamic state. But within two months, he was overthrown by PDP remnants including elements within the military.

It should be noted that all this happened before the Soviet military intervention. National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski publicly admitted–months before Soviet troops entered the country–that the Carter administration was providing huge sums to Muslim extremists to subvert the reformist government. Part of that effort involved brutal attacks by the CIA-backed mujahideen against schools and teachers in rural areas.

In late 1979, the seriously besieged PDP government asked Moscow to send a contingent of troops to help ward off the mujahideen (Islamic guerrilla fighters) and foreign mercenaries, all recruited, financed, and well-armed by the CIA. The Soviets already had been sending aid for projects in mining, education, agriculture, and public health. Deploying troops represented a commitment of a more serious and politically dangerous sort. It took repeated requests from Kabul before Moscow agreed to intervene militarily.

Jihad and Taliban, CIA Style

The Soviet intervention was a golden opportunity for the CIA to transform the tribal resistance into a holy war, an Islamic jihad to expel the godless communists from Afghanistan. Over the years the United States and Saudi Arabia expended about $40 billion on the war in Afghanistan. The CIA and its allies recruited, supplied, and trained almost 100,000 radical mujahideen from forty Muslim countries including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, and Afghanistan itself. Among those who answered the call was Saudi-born millionaire right-winger Osama bin Laden and his cohorts.

After a long and unsuccessful war, the Soviets evacuated the country in February 1989. It is generally thought that the PDP Marxist government collapsed immediately after the Soviet departure. Actually, it retained enough popular support to fight on for another three years, outlasting the Soviet Union itself by a year.

Upon taking over Afghanistan, the mujahideen fell to fighting among themselves. They ravaged the cities, terrorized civilian populations, looted, staged mass executions, closed schools, raped thousands of women and girls, and reduced half of Kabul to rubble. In 2001 Amnesty International reported that the mujahideen used sexual assault as “a method of intimidating vanquished populations and rewarding soldiers.’”

Ruling the country gangster-style and looking for lucrative sources of income, the tribes ordered farmers to plant opium poppy. The Pakistani ISI, a close junior partner to the CIA, set up hundreds of heroin laboratories across Afghanistan. Within two years of the CIA’s arrival, the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderland became the biggest producer of heroin in the world.

Largely created and funded by the CIA, the mujahideen mercenaries now took on a life of their own. Hundreds of them returned home to Algeria, Chechnya, Kosovo, and Kashmir to carry on terrorist attacks in Allah’s name against the purveyors of secular “corruption.”

In Afghanistan itself, by 1995 an extremist strain of Sunni Islam called the Taliban—heavily funded and advised by the ISI and the CIA and with the support of Islamic political parties in Pakistan—fought its way to power, taking over most of the country, luring many tribal chiefs into its fold with threats and bribes.

The Taliban promised to end the factional fighting and banditry that was the mujahideen trademark. Suspected murderers and spies were executed monthly in the sports stadium, and those accused of thievery had the offending hand sliced off. The Taliban condemned forms of “immorality” that included premarital sex, adultery, and homosexuality. They also outlawed all music, theater, libraries, literature, secular education, and much scientific research.

The Taliban unleashed a religious reign of terror, imposing an even stricter interpretation of Muslim law than used by most of the Kabul clergy. All men were required to wear untrimmed beards and women had to wear the burqa which covered them from head to toe, including their faces. Persons who were slow to comply were dealt swift and severe punishment by the Ministry of Virtue. A woman who fled an abusive home or charged spousal abuse would herself be severely whipped by the theocratic authorities. Women were outlawed from social life, deprived of most forms of medical care, barred from all levels of education, and any opportunity to work outside the home. Women who were deemed “immoral” were stoned to death or buried alive.

None of this was of much concern to leaders in Washington who got along famously with the Taliban. As recently as 1999, the US government was paying the entire annual salary of every single Taliban government official. Not until October 2001, when President George W. Bush had to rally public opinion behind his bombing campaign in Afghanistan did he denounce the Taliban’s oppression of women. His wife, Laura Bush, emerged overnight as a full-blown feminist to deliver a public address detailing some of the abuses committed against Afghan women.

If anything positive can be said about the Taliban, it is that they did put a stop to much of the looting, raping, and random killings that the mujahideen had practiced on a regular basis. In 2000 Taliban authorities also eradicated the cultivation of opium poppy throughout the areas under their control, an effort judged by the United Nations International Drug Control Program to have been nearly totally successful. With the Taliban overthrown and a Western-selected mujahideen government reinstalled in Kabul by December 2001, opium poppy production in Afghanistan increased dramatically.

The years of war that have followed have taken tens of thousands of Afghani lives. Along with those killed by Cruise missiles, Stealth bombers, Tomahawks, daisy cutters, and land mines are those who continue to die of hunger, cold, lack of shelter, and lack of water.

Continued >>

Drawing the Future From the Past

December 7, 2008

By Channapha Khamvongsa | Foreign Policy in Focus, Dec 5, 2008

The bombing was relentless. From 1964 to 1973, the United States dropped more than 2 million tons of ordnance on Laos. That’s a planeload of bombs every eight minutes, 24 hours a day, for nine years. Laos has the unfortunate distinction of being the most heavily bombed country in the history of the world.

“In the area of Xieng Khoang, the place of my birth, there was health, good earth, and fine weather,” one survivor, a 33-year-old man, recalls of that period. “But then the airplanes came, bombing the rice fields and the forests, making us leave our land and rice fields with great sadness. One day a plane came bombing my rice field as well as the village. I had gone very early to harrow the field. I thought, ‘I am only a village rice farmer, the airplane will not shoot me.’ But that day truly it did shoot me and wounded me together with my buffalo, which was the source of a hundred thousand loves and a hundred thousand worries for me.”

For nearly three decades, the U.S. secret war in Laos and the impact of the most massive bombing campaign in the world was nearly forgotten. For those who remembered, the events seemed surreal. They witnessed the reckless destruction of a people and their land, and careful efforts by the U.S. government to conceal it. For those too young to know, gathering information and knowledge of this history was scattered and fragmented. It seemed the secret war in Laos and its aftermath would remain a secret.

But then a remarkable set of drawings and eyewitness accounts came to light. Laotian villagers put their memories on paper in the 1970s to depict the secret bombing of their country. This trove of reminiscences became the inspiration for Legacies of War. Founded by Laotian Americans in 2004, the project raises awareness about the history of the Vietnam War-era bombing in Laos. Using a unique combination of art, culture, education, community organizing, advocacy, and dialogue, Legacies of War also works for the removal of unexploded bombs in Laos, to provide space for healing the wounds of war, and to create greater hope for a future of peace.
A Secret War, a People Scattered

When the United States withdrew from Indochina, the “Secret War” in Laos was lost to history. But the legacy of the war lives on. Up to 30% of the cluster bombs dropped by the United States in Laos failed to detonate, leaving extensive contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the countryside. That translates into 78 to 130 million unexploded bomblets. Over one-third of the land in Laos is contaminated. These “bombies,” as the Lao now call them, have killed or maimed more than 34,000 people since the war’s end, and continue to claim more innocent victims every day. About 40% of accidents result in death, and 60% of the victims are children. UXO remains a major barrier to the safety, health, livelihoods, and food security of the people of Laos.

The war also displaced up to one-third of the Lao population. Nearly 750,000 would eventually become refugees in France, Australia, and Canada, among other countries. Over 350,000 refugees from Laos came to the United States after having experienced war, destruction, death, imprisonment, family separation, loss of homeland, loss of identity, and loss of control over their destinies. Many had undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder. But these weren’t things Laotian refugees had the luxury to contemplate, for basic economic survival trumped all other needs.
Drawing on the Past

Between December 1970 and May 1971, Fred Branfman, an American, and Boungeun, a Lao man, collected illustrations and narratives in the Vientiane refugee camps, where bombing victims fled. The drawings and narratives represent the voiceless, faceless, and nameless who endured an air war campaign committed in secrecy. Drawn in pencil, pens, crayons, and markers, they are raw and stark, reflecting the crude events that shaped their reality. The simplicity of the narration and drawings emphasize the illustrators’ identities as ordinary villagers who bore witness to a devastating event.

For instance, an 18-year-old woman remembers, “In the year 1967, my village built small shelters in the forest and we had holes in the bamboo thicket on top of the hill. It was a place to which we could flee. But there were two brothers who went out to cut wood in the forest. The airplanes shot them and both brothers died. Their mother and father had just these two sons and were both in the same hole with me. I think with much pity about this old father and mother who were like crazy people because their children had died.”

Each of the illustrations demonstrates the violence of warfare. However, the images of blood and death are contradicted by the memories of the scenic and peaceful village life these survivors once lived. Scenes show farmers tending to their rice fields, monks praying at the temple, women going to the market, and children playing in the schoolyard. The drawings capture the very moments when their lives and society were forever altered. The illustrations and narratives are at the heart of the Legacies of War National Traveling Exhibition, which is accompanied by historical photos, maps and other relevant documents to give context to the decade-long bombings.

Only a small circle of individuals knew of the existence of these illustrations. The pictures hadn’t been seen in decades, not since the end of the war. A fortuitous meeting between me and Institute for Policy Studies director John Cavanagh led to the return of the illustrations to the Lao American community. In the last several years, thousands of visitors have seen the illustrations through the Legacies of War traveling exhibit and other community forums. Although most Laotian Americans didn’t experience the same horrors depicted in the drawings, the illustrations invoke memory of their own stories of refuge, survival, and resilience.

The reaction to the drawings was instructive to Legacies’ work. Initially considered an artifact, the illustrations have become a living document. One at a time, each drawing tells the story of a survivor. Although the illustrations were from four decades ago, they inspire others to share their stories, contributing to a collective narrative that began long ago in Laos, but continues today through the voices of Laotian Americans.

Following a viewing of the illustrations at an exhibit in Lowell, Massachusetts, a Lao woman in the audience stood up to speak at a community forum, “The illustrations made me remember. I have not shared, not even with my family because I didn’t think it was important. When I was a young woman in Laos, I worked as a nurse to help people hurt by the bombing. Every day, the airplanes would come: Boom! Boom! Boom! And then one day, it came so close to us, we had to hide in the cave and we hear right outside the cave, the sound so loud. It scared me so much. I feel so lucky I did not die. The pictures made me remember. I am so sad that today, people in Lao are still being hurt and dying from these bombs.” The woman, whose husband had spoken on several occasions about his experience, had never shared hers. The illustrations and community forum gave her a chance to tell her story for the first time in 30 years. Today, she remains engaged in educating people in the Boston-area about the bombing and its aftermath.

These new voices and stories are captured in various ways through Legacies of War: interactive exhibition pieces, community programs, oral history interviews, theater performance pieces, and new commissioned works of art. Based on oral histories collected from Laotian refugees and their descendents, the Refugee Nation theater piece reveals connections between U.S. and Southeast Asian history, and the unique challenges faced by political refugees and their American children. Touching on themes of identity, globalization, and activism, it brings a Laotian voice to a growing part of the Asian-American Diaspora that is yet to be included in the American experience. <

The integration of storytelling, art, and performance are critical in breaking the silence. By creating multiple access points of engagement, Legacies of War facilitates the connection of personal stories to a collective experience in recognition that we are not alone in our experiences, that we are connected to a larger narrative and a larger context. The acknowledgement of a shared journey and struggle could lead to collective strength and power.

Since the end to the U.S. wars in Southeast Asia, many other wars have been waged, in other parts of the world, in new terrain, villages, and communities. Yet, the wars in Southeast Asia lingers. And for the people living in Laos as well as those who became refugees, the lingering impact of war remains ever present in their daily lives. Although war and conflict created the refugee community, they don’t have to define it. Through the transformative power of stories, art, and performance, Laotian Americans are evolving from victim to agency of change. “Now that I know about the secret war,” said a Lao American student in Seattle, “I have to do something about the horrible things that are still happening to people. As Americans, we must do something.”

Another victim, a 37-year old woman, reflects, “Our lives became like those of animals desperately trying to escape their hunters . . . Human beings, whose parents brought them into the world and carefully raised them with overflowing love despite so many difficulties, these human beings would die from a single blast as explosions burst, lying still without moving again at all. And who then thinks of the blood, flesh, sweat and strength of their parents, and who will have charity and pity for them?…In reality, whatever happens, it is only the innocent who suffer. And as for other men, do they know all the unimaginable things happening in this war?”
Copyright © 2008, Institute for Policy Studies

Channapha Khamvongsa, the executive director of Legacies of War, is a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor.

Putting a human mask on imperialism

December 3, 2008

Politicians and historians may argue that the U.S. is a force for good around the world, but the facts show the opposite.

MAINSTREAM AND liberal opposition to the Iraq war is based on accepting the aims of the war, but criticizing its lack of success, its “excesses” or its tactical or strategic mistakes.

Columnist: Paul D’Amato

Paul D'Amato Paul D’Amato is managing editor of the International Socialist Review and author of The Meaning of Marxism, a lively and accessible introduction to the ideas of Karl Marx and the tradition he founded.

The argument of people who hold this view is that the Iraq invasion was a mistake, not because it denied the sovereignty of the Iraqi people, or that it has led to the deaths of tens of thousands, the displacement of millions and the destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure. It was a mistake because it failed to achieve U.S. objectives.

Barack Obama, for example, criticizes the Iraq war because it has weakened U.S. power–it has emboldened its enemies, such as Iran and North Korea–and created a crisis of U.S. credibility abroad. Instead, he argues, the U.S. should shift troops to Afghanistan, organize a phased withdrawal from Iraq (but leave a “residual force”) and maintain an “over the horizon” military presence to intervene when necessary.

Obama is fully committed to the idea that the U.S. should continue to be the world’s unchallenged global military power; he merely believes that there are better ways to achieve that goal.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

AHMED RASHID, in his new book on Afghanistan, Descent into Chaos, offers a tortured variation of this argument.

He says he supported the invasion of Afghanistan as a “just war and not an imperialist intervention, because only external intervention could save the Afghan people from the Taliban and al-Qaeda and prevent the spread of al-Qaeda.”

Rashid himself admits, however, that none of these aims have been achieved:

Instead, the U.S.-led war on terrorism has left in its wake a far more unstable world than existed on that momentous day in 2001…Afghanistan is once again staring down the abyss of state collapse, despite billions of dollars in aid, 45,000 Western troops and the deaths of thousands of people. The Taliban have made a dramatic comeback, enlisting the help of al-Qaeda and Islamic extremists in Pakistan, and getting a boost from the explosion of heroin production that has helped fund their movement.

Rashid’s logic boils down to this: because I supported the stated aims of the invasion, it cannot be imperialist.

This is a bad method. Better to look at the facts of the case: The biggest military power in the world invaded a country halfway around the world that had never threatened the U.S. It proceeded to occupy the country, remove the existing government from power and install a government to its own liking, which it maintains through a military occupation. Pardon me for concluding that this is imperialism.

What galls Rashid is not that a great power violated Afghanistan’s sovereignty, but that it wasn’t done with sufficient tact. “Above all, arrogance and ignorance were on display,” he complains, when the Bush administration “invaded two countries in the Muslim world without any attempt to understand the history, culture, society or traditions of those countries.”

In other words, it’s not arrogant to invade and conquer another country; it’s arrogant to not learn more about it first.

The Bush administration wanted to “declare victory” after removing the Taliban, “get out, and move on to Iraq,” when it should have had a longer-term commitment, according to Rashid. By his own account, Afghanistan was primarily a stepping-stone to the war in Iraq, and both wars were part of a long-term plan to reshape the Middle East and the wider region under the rubric of an open-ended “war on terror.”

Part of the Bush and Rumsfeld Doctrine was the idea that regimes could be changed on the cheap by swift, decisive invasions, after which things could quickly be wrapped up, and messy, long wars of occupation could be avoided. That is why security in Afghanistan was handed over to “warlords and drug barons.”

What the U.S. should have done, he explains, is commit itself to “nation-building” in Afghanistan–a decades-long plan involving “massive aid, internal economic reforms, democratization and literacy.”

To believe in this paternalistic fantasy, one must ignore America’s long history of genocide and conquest in North America; its brutal occupations, annexations and colonizations in the Caribbean and Pacific; its destruction of Korea and Vietnam; its sanctions against Iraq that killed a million people; and finally, one must ignore what Rashid admits to be true–that the U.S. has wrecked both Iraq and Afghanistan over the past several years.

Rashid is either naïve or is trying to deliberately put a human mask over the ugly face of U.S. imperialism.

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RASHID IS a kind of utopian imperialist, who looks at what is and can only counterpose to it a kinder, gentler version. To counter this neocon fantasy, Rashid offers a fantasy of his own: the revival of British-style colonialism. I must quote him at length here to give the reader the full flavor of his argument:

The neocons seemed to have no knowledge of what history had taught us about empires. The great empire builders quickly learned that when it came to ruling newly conquered lands, they had to put back in almost as much as they took out. If the conqueror was to extract raw materials, taxes, manpower he needed from the colony, he had to establish a system of security and law and order over the conquered and help his subjects maintain their economic livelihoods.

Most significantly, empire builders from Alexander the Great to Queen Victoria had to learn about their subjects if they want to rule over them with any authority. At the very least, they had to be curious about them. In the 19th century, the British epitomized a colonialism that exploited with responsibility, used force judiciously and yet learned about its subject peoples.

History might beg to differ. At its height, the British Empire covered a quarter of the world’s land surface and ruled over 400 million people. It ruled first by conquest, then by dividing up the populations and pitting them against one other. It “learned” about its subjects in order to better dominate them.

When it could not cow its subjects into believing in their own innate inferiority, it resorted to unstinting force. The history of British colonialism begins with the brutal conquest and partition of Ireland, moves through the enslavement of Black Africans to work the great plantations of the Caribbean, on to the conquest of India and China, and ends with the carving up, with the other great powers, of Africa in order to get at its diamonds, gold and other precious resources. The bones of those who resisted the British are strewn across several continents.

Britain drained India of its wealth. Under the first 120 years of British rule, there were 31 famines in India in which at least 15 million people died, all during which Britain drained tribute from India and exported grain from its ports.

Historian Irfan Habib calculates the average annual drain at about 9 percent of India’s GNP. At the time just before the British conquest, 1750, India accounted for about one quarter of the world’s manufacturing output. By 1900, India accounted for only 1.7 percent.

Clearly, the British did not “put back in almost as much as they took out,” either in India or in Africa, which to this day remains, despite being resource-rich, the poorest continent on the planet.

“History does not record a single instance,” remarked the Indian nationalist Romesh Dutt, “of one people ruling another in the interests of the subject nation.” When politicians and apologists for U.S. intervention talk about “saving” another country by invading it, we should remember Dutt’s words.

Half of Afghan prisoners have not faced trial-U.N.

December 2, 2008
Source: Reuters

By Jonathon Burch
KABUL, Dec 1 (Reuters) – More Afghans are being detained without trial, with poor people or those without powerful connections, the most common victims, unable to pay bribes to secure their release, the United Nations said on Monday.
Afghanistan is emerging from nearly 30 years of war and its judicial and law enforcement systems are still very much in their infancy. Corruption is endemic at all levels of the police force, experts say, who often milk the populace for bribes.
“Pre-trial detention is supposed to be the exception and not the rule, but in this country it is more the rule, especially if you are poor and without powerful friends,” said Christina Oguz, head of the U.N.’s drug and crime agency in Afghanistan.
Speaking at a news conference in Kabul on Monday, Oguz talked about the prevalence of what she called, “telephone justice”, whereby a phonecall to the right police officer or judge was sometimes all that was needed to be released.
“If you have powerful friends and commit a crime you may not even face a trial because a phonecall to the police or to the prosecutor can be made to release you,” said Oguz.
“If you don’t have these powerful friends you may end up behind bars even if you are a child,” she said.
While the number of prisoners in Afghanistan remains relatively low, the figure has has more than doubled in the last three years, says the U.N., with 12,500 prisoners in the country compared with 6,000 in January 2006.
In December 2007, the U.N. estimated that around 50 percent of prisoners were pre-trial detainees.
Another problem facing prisoners in Afghanistan, said Oguz, is that many often remain in jail long after their sentence has expired, in effect serving “double” sentences as they are unable to pay the additional fine.
“If you are poor, again, you may end up staying in prison even though your prison sentence has ended because you cannot pay your fund or you cannot bribe yourself out,” said Oguz. “We have found many cases of people who are still in prison after their time has been served,” she said. Oguz said that Afghanistan needed to look to alternatives to imprisonment, such as suspended sentences, house arrests and fines but not on top of any prison sentence.
“Prison should not be the first sentence that comes to your mind for the majority of cases,” she said. “Prison is often a very expensive way of making a bad situation worse.” (Editing by Sanjeev Miglani)
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Clinton’s India ties may complicate Obama policy

December 2, 2008

MATTHEW LEE and PETE YOST
AP News

Dec 01, 2008 18:30 EST

The close ties with India that Secretary of State-nominee Hillary Rodham Clinton forged during her years as a U.S. senator and presidential candidate could complicate diplomatic perceptions of her ability to serve as a neutral broker between India and its nuclear neighbor, Pakistan.

With tensions rising between India and Pakistan after last week’s deadly terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Hillary Clinton faces an early test of her influence in South Asia, where President-elect Barack Obama on Monday said that instability and the rise of militants pose “the single most important threat against the American people.”

Both Hillary Clinton and her husband, former President Bill Clinton, have maintained warm relations for years with India and the Indian-American community. As New York’s senator for eight years and as a 2008 presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton toured India and visited with Indian officials and entrepreneurs, and her campaigns profited from the largesse of Indian-American fundraisers. Bill Clinton’s charitable foundation has been funded by some of the same well-heeled Indian businessmen who backed his wife’s campaigns.

In her new role as the nation’s top diplomat, Hillary Clinton would project Obama’s policies, not her own. But even foreign affairs experts who wave off suggestions that Hillary Clinton would lean toward either Asian power acknowledge that the perception of such a tilt could cause suspicions in Pakistan. South Asia experts reject the assertion of bias, but they acknowledge it exists.

“There are some who believe it, but I think most people think she is an objective observer with a good understanding of South Asia,” said Walter Andersen, Associate Director of the South Asia Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies. Andersen insisted perceptions of Hillary Clinton’s bias toward India are “based on inaccuracy.”

Karin Von Hippel, a South Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed, saying Hillary Clinton is “very balanced” and “understands almost better than anybody how delicate the situation is between these two countries.”

Still, perceptions matter, especially in the region. “There are concerns that she is seen as pro-India, she and her husband both,” said one Washington-based foreign diplomat with extensive experience in South Asia. “The Pakistanis definitely see them as closer and friendlier to India.”

The diplomat spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive issue of India and Pakistan, which have fought three wars — two of them over the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir — since winning independence from Britain.

Influential members of the Indian-American community have rejoiced in Hillary Clinton’s selection as secretary of state.

“Sen. Clinton will continue the close relationship between the United States and India that started with the Clinton administration and has progressed in the Bush years,” said Varun Nikore, founder of the Indian-American Leadership Initiative, an independent political organization supporting Democratic candidates.

“You cannot expect that any nominee for secretary of state would have a special relationship going into this job, but we’re very lucky that we have in Sen. Clinton someone who is already well-versed on one of the more important countries and emerging economies in the world,” said Nikore.

A current State Department official allowed that Bill Clinton had substantially boosted engagement with India, but noted that any administration would likely have done so. The official stressed that President George W. Bush has continued that course, most recently signing a civilian nuclear pact with New Delhi.

“None of this has been meant to exclude Pakistan, but it is a zero-sum game when you are dealing with these two countries,” the official said. “You can’t do something with one without it affecting the other.” The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal administration thinking.

Ties between the United States and India improved dramatically, as did Pakistani suspicions of pro-India bias in Washington, during Bill Clinton’s administration, which embraced India as a major power and market as it opened its economy in the 1990s.

The administration’s disparate treatment of India and Pakistan was most apparent during a 2000 Asian trip, with the president spending five days in India and seven hours in Pakistan.

The Clinton White House barred media coverage of the Pakistan stop and released only an official photo of Bill Clinton and Gen. Pervez Musharraf seated among aides, 12 feet across from each other. Bill Clinton admonished Pakistan’s military government to retreat from its nuclear weapons course and to lower dangerous tensions with India.

In a speech to India’s Parliament on that trip, Bill Clinton said he shared many of New Delhi’s concerns about “the course Pakistan is taking; your disappointment that past overtures have not always met with success; your outrage over recent violence. I know it is difficult to be a democracy bordered by nations whose governments reject democracy.”

Early during her presidential campaign in 2008, the former first lady pointed to the “strong partnership” that Bill Clinton forged between India and the U.S. As New York’s senator, Hillary Clinton also touted her role as co-chair of the Senate India Caucus.

“As president I will work with India to make our strong friendship even stronger,” Hillary Clinton promised earlier this year.

During the presidential campaign, Indian-Americans reciprocated Hillary Clinton’s long-standing embrace of India by giving generously — $2 million at a single fundraiser in New York in 2007.

At one point, the Obama camp prepared, but then disavowed, a campaign memo that carried the headline “Hillary Clinton (D-Punjab),” a mocking play on the standard reference to a candidates’ party and constituency.

The memo, which created a furor in India and the Indian-American community, also referred to the Clintons’ investments in India, Sen. Clinton’s fundraising among Indian-Americans and the former president’s $300,000 in speech fees from Cisco, a company that has moved U.S. jobs to India.

Obama called the memo “a dumb mistake” and “not reflective of the long-standing relationship I have had with the Indian-American community.”

Now as president-elect, Obama has chosen Hillary Clinton to be his chief diplomat and highlighted India and Pakistan as priorities for his administration.

“The situation in South Asia as a whole and the safe havens for terrorists that have been established there represent the single most important threat against the American people,” he told reporters at a news conference Monday as he unveiled his foreign policy and national security team, including Hillary Clinton.

___

Associated Press writer Devlin Barrett contributed to this report.

Source: AP News

Trial into the murder of human rights journalist Anna Politkovskay

December 2, 2008

Livewire.amnesty.org

Friederike Behr blogs from Russia on the Anna Politkovskaya murder trial

Anna Politkovskaya - murdered on 6 October 2006. ©Katja Tähjä

Anna Politkovskaya – murdered on 6 October 2006. ©Katja Tähjä

Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya was murdered on 6 October 2006 in Moscow. She was shot on a Saturday afternoon, when she walked into the lift in the apartment building she lived in.

I had met her several times, one time right after Russian special forces had stormed a theatre in Moscow, where a group of men and women had taken over 800 people hostage. Anna Politkovskaya had tried to intervene and help to save the lives of those in the theatre. Subsequently, the theatre was stormed and about 150 people died.

Another time, in the Caucasus, she had just returned from meeting then Chechen prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov. He and his assistant had issued quite serious threats against her. Both times I was very much impressed by the way she responded to such experiences, not stepping back an inch, determined to continue her work.

Anna Politkovskaya had reported about the human rights situation in Chechnya since 1999 for the newspaper Novaya Gazeta . Her fearless and dedicated coverage of the conflict had been acknowledged through numerous awards including the Global Award for Human Rights Journalism from Amnesty International UK in 2001. She had also written extensively about abuses in other parts of Russia such as violence in the army, corruption in state structures, and police brutality.

Anna Politkovskaya faced intimidation and harassment from the Russian and Chechen authorities due to her outspoken criticism of government policy and action. She had been detained and threatened with serious reprisals for her reporting on several occasions.

Amnesty International campaigned throughout the period of investigation into her murder for the investigation to be full, thorough and impartial and for everyone involved in her murder to be brought to justice in procedures in line with international fair trial standards. Amnesty International members around the world have campaigned for this for the last two years.

The trial into her murder started with a preliminary hearing in October 2008, the first public hearing took place on 17 November.

Amnesty International was deeply concerned about the decision of the judge at Moscow’s District Military Court on 19 November to close the hearing based on expressions of fear from the side of the jury. No member of the jury had received any threats and as it turned out later, when one of the jury members went public and gave an interview to the Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy, the jury had not requested for the trial to be held in camera.

At the next hearing, on 25 November, it was decided to open the trial again. The office of the prosecutor general questioned the judges impartiality but at the moment, he will continue to preside over the trial.

These twists and changes in the trial procedures make it even more important for Amnesty International to monitor the trial and to try to inform its membership as much as possible about it. Monitoring the trial and reporting about it may help to combat impunity and that’s why I’ll be there.